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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUDAEMONOLOGICAL
ARGUMEN'.r

The oudaemonological argument tor the existence ot
God ia baaed on the existence tn the rational appetite ot a
We pl'opose, therefore. to review

natural deaire tor God.

brietlr the history 01' theorie. of natural de8ire tor God,

then to anal,... the f1lJgum.ent Itselt:l and tinally to test the
validity of the argument.
In a oreationiat philoaophy

1s unanmously

ot the world, one tact

acoepted by all parties to the queltion.

All

agree that every oreature implicitly and neoeasarily doe8 seek

God in every action.

Considering man more particularly, how-

ever, and asking tu.rtb.er whether man naturally seeks God and
how God figures aa a natural object ot manta rational appetite,
we find evidenoe of roughly tlu.-ee positions.

We sball outline

these position. briefly at once and then examine them indivIdually in more detal1.

In this historioal a.na.l.781a we shall

tollow in general the monograph of Patriok It. Bastable on the

subJeot. 1

-1

Patrick K. Butable, .De_s;;,;;;:i...
re.;.... f~ God, London, 1947.
1

p
2

How, then, doe. God .figuN "a the objeot ot the
rational appetite?

For tba moat part, the Domin1can 'fhomists

.ould e.nswer that the higheat u..

1;be

ns.~a!

contemplation ot God.

God direotly.

or

man's natural powers :1s

In tbis sena., man does .eek

A modem .ehoel o.f 'lhom1sts, in which Rousaelot

and Mar_ahal bave been promiMnt, wou14 agJ.'ee that God 1s the

supreme object ot the natural powers of man, but they go on
to say that theae same powers naturall,. de.ire an even more

direot knowledge ot H1m..

Man desire. to know God d1:rectl,.-·

although he has no natural pow.x- to do so.

The th1l:'d achool

of thought. tn! tla:teci b7 Dllrul Scotus, aaTs tbat the natural
desireaf man 1a, strictly speaking, not tor
of God, but tor d11"e.1; vi8ion ot Htm.

1nd~eot

knowledge

Man naturally de.ires

and, gl"anted pertect ule ot his faculties, baa the natural
power to ... God directly_

w.

bave thea. tbr•• po.ttls. in general there:t'o1"8.

The first hold. tbat man. naturall,. d.8U-•• to know (Jod

ineill.ftll-

'!be

aecond holda tbat man naturally desires to

know Gqdd1r,o!1l but does not have tbe natural power to do so.

And the thUd holds that man natUl'aU,. de.itte. to know God
direot17 and bas the power to do

.0.

The first and second

positions both cla1m to be the eorreot and orig1nal. teaohins
of

st.

'.tbomas on the matter, or at least the oorrect interpre-

tation of his teaching.

3

•
The question of natuPal 4&s1re tor God is one that
arises in the 8ul1st soholastie phUoaophers.

The further

d••• lopment, that beeauss it is a natural deaire it otters

another method. of demonstrating the existence ot God, 1s of
].ater origin.

St .. Thoma. himself never reterx-ed to natural

desire asa posslble proof for the existence of God.

U we

oan grant, however. an Wtlal na'tuJ1tal desire tor God 1n tho
rationa.l appetite, and lt it ls a. na:tural d.a1re 1n the strict
sense ot the teN, then the proof 1. a necessary corollary ot
tbe des11'e.

For, gl"anted the existence of such a desire, ••

IlUst admit the existenoe

ot its term.

Absolu.tely speaking,

such a natUl"al desire cannot be frustrated.
Our inv•• tigation. therefore"

two questions,
4••11'. God?

Gone.rna itself with

The tlrat. doea the rational. appetite naturall,.

'l'he .scond, 1t such is the oa•• , can this natut'al

4•• ire be •••d to demonstrate the existence ot God?
About tM t11'8' queatlon, namely, that in the
rational appetite there 18 a tJPe ot natural desire

there is no dlffioult,.

f~

God,

This beoomes clear- 1f we consider the

neoe$sElrY relationShip bfttween creature Slld Oreator.

oreation, God diftu••• His own goodness.

In

And as exemplary

cause, God necessarlly reproduces in the creature some imitation ot His own goodness.

Every created thing w111 be in some

4.
• a1 an imitation of His own goOdness.

In seeking, therefore,

any created good, man inevitably seeks Goodness itself.
Gilson says:

It we say that each good 1s but a particular good
we can only mean, not that these particular goods
are detached puts ot a whole which would be
Goodness, but that the.,. are analogues ot the creative Good that save them birth. In this sense,
then, it 1s true that to love any good "batao.".r
1s always to love 1ts resemblance to the divine
goodness, and, sinee 1t is this resemblanoe to God
that makes this good to be a good, we oan say that
what 1s loved 1n it 1s the Sovereign Good. In
other words, 1t is impossible to lon the 1m.age with..
out at the same time lOVing the wlg1nal .. and it .e
know, as WfJ do know, that tbe 1mage a onl7 an image,
1t 18 impossible to love 1t without p~.:r.l'T1ng the
~1g1nal.
What holds or the whole totality at creatures holds much more ot tnan in particular. 'fa w111
any objeot 18 to wlU an 1ma.ae ot God, that 1s, to
w111 God; to love oneselt, tben, '11111 be ti love an
analogue of God, and that ls to 10...e God. .

In a creationiat phl1oaophl of thing.. con••quent1:r, there 1.
no difficulty about the :relation of eve'!!'1 being to (lod aa to
a tinal cau.e.

This d •• ire tor God is implicit 1n the activity

or every creature.
Wllen we ask the second question, whether this desiI'e

tor God be the basi. tor an independent d.emonatration of His
existence # the way become. considerably more complica.ted •

.. .,

".

~~----------------------------------------------------,

TbB eudaemonological argument would seek to prove the existence
of God from the DAtural tendency of the rational appetite to.ard Him.

Our immediate

task~

before considering at length the

argument itself, 18 to sketch briefly the history of natural

desire.
It is questIonable whether

W$

can apeak of a natural.

desire for God, in the proper sense of the term, in the writings

ot pagan philosophers. There 1s no doubt. hoWever. that they
did give indication of tb.e sublime goals atta1nable by man.

perhaps Plato expreas•• this best=
lie who has been instructed thUs tar in tM things
of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in
due order and ncc•• sion, when he oomes toward the
end will suddenly perceIve a nature o£ wondrOu.s beauty

(and this, Socrates, 1. the tinal caua8 of all our
tormal toils) • • • • And the true order of gOing, or
being led by another, to the things of love, 1s to
begin trom the b4Jautie. ot earth and mount upward.
tor tbe sake ot that other beauty, uaUlg these as steps
only~ and trom one go1ng on to two" and from two to
all fail' forma, and fl"01n fair forms to tail" practices,
and from tail" practioe. to tail' notiona, until from
tair notion. be urlves lLt the notion ot tl:le abaolute
beauty, and at last know. wbat the essence of beauty
1s. This, my dear Socrates. • • 1s that lUe above
all others whioh man .hould live, in the oontemplation of absolute be~t1; a beauty Which i t you once
beheld, you would see to be not after the mea.upe of
gold, and garment., and tail' boys and youtha, whose
prfulence now entrances you, and you and. many a one
would be content to 11ve aeeing them only and. converslng with them without meat 01' drink, it that .ere
p08s1bl.e.-you only "ant to look at them. and to be with
them. But .bat i t man had .,..s to Me the true beauty-the divine beauty, I mean, pUl"e and olear and unalloyed,

6
•
not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all
the colors and vanities of human life--thither look~
ing, and. holding converse with tho true beauty simple
and divine? Remember how in that communion 0111y, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he w111 be
enabled to bring forth. not images 01.' beauty. but
realities (tor be bas hold not at a.n image but of a
reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true
virtue to bee om. the 1.'1' lend of God and be 1mm.ortal,
i f mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble lite? 2

Thus Plato outlines the relationship of participated goodness
to the essence of goodness and reveals the natural tendency of
the soul to seek goodness in its purest torm.
Aristotle teaches that a natural desire 1s found in

• .,ery natuzaal torm.
sire to know.

In the intellect we tind the natural de-

Sinee the intelleot 1.

man'.

most perfeot power,

reasons Aristotle, the end ot man will be the activity ot that

power speculating on the highest attainable truths.
desire 01.' the will is tor happiness.

Men

dirre~

The natura.l

as to the na-

ture 01: what makes man truly happy, but for Aristotle it was

the perfect use ot the intelleot, manta highest faculty.
Aristotle speaks, therefore, ot natural

des~e,

strictly speaking, no natural desire tor

but he haa,

~.

In the writings 01: Augustine there i8 no lack of
tbeory coneerning natural desire for God.

2!.

2

But at the same time

Plato, Sl!2osium. tral. B. Jowett,
_pl;;;;;.;;a.....t .....
o, New York, 1899. 211 t.

~D1alogues

there ia no Indication ot a ptlN17 'Ph l108ophloal rieW'P0lnt.
ThUS the vibrant expres.ion of the only hi.tor1e.l
• .,81'

had: "Thou hast tOl'l1ed

\UI

.~

man

tor thyselt, and our hearts

are restless until they reat 1n the.," 18 ot ltttle utility
1n the

~re8ent

dlacu8aion.

We begin our stud,. of natural dealre, ps-operl,..

epeak1nF., with

at. Thomaa. An6 the tIrltt tact to

be raced 1.

that Thomas apparentl,. contHd!.otad himself 1n .".aklnp! ot
natural desire.

Tb1s apparent contradictlon 1s ohvlou8 It we

consider two passares of Thomas torether.

(Author'. itallce.)

55.nee then it !.8 impossible f'~ a natural d ••l "
to be vold,-and it would be were it impos8ible to
err!.vt!¥ at underatandlnr, the d1vine substance, ,t~l !l!
desire th18 qatur.}.&f ..... muet oonolude tbat
',s p08sf61e for tlie (! " ne eubstanee to be se.n by
mean. of the lntellect. • • .3

,tnt!

Wherefore .en anyone •• If-counseled and aided 'by
divine graoe chooses a ce~taln ~od, whleh aotually
constitute. bi. prope~ ha~p1nese, to aohieve hie
hap"lnes., then he ",ins 1'l'l8rl t , not becauss the
bapp1nee8 he aoh1eved wae natural, but rathe, becaus!
the particular th,lf!8 M achieved wai"iiot lea

rea

iii'turatt;r',' '''u'O'li 'as' to:;-"rilon 'Of 'ttOa',t·..·in ili"t"oli actually h1iibiatrtu&. !oe$ eonslat'••

11'.

, ......

s

0.0 •• III, 51, Summa Contra

Thomas Agulnaa, Enp:l1ab Dom1iiIoan

lB.

I. -

r~nt~e.

of St.

'Fa£&r;;:... tOon ..-r9B, III,
fI

'"

8.
While the tirst text seems to indicate a natural desire for
God, it is apparently contradioted by the second.

We can state

at once that it is not the object of this paper to enter this
problem in textual interpretation.

MoreOVer, because Thomas

does not himself mention the eudaemonological argument, we do
not have to discuss directly his doctrine on natural desire.
Wha.t we are interested in is the studies of this app&l'lont contradiction made by subsequent Thomists.

F'or it is in these

stUdies that the evolution of the oudaemono1ogical arguraent
is apparent.
We can enter now a. rapid survey of ll'homistlc teach...
ing on natUl'al de sire.

rthe souree for much of the following

matter is the dissertation of Patriek K. Bastablo, Desire
for
..
.............
~, whioh otters a detailed study ot the history ot natural
desire among Thomists.

or

the great oommentators. Cajetan oonoerns himself

!

I

only with the question of natural desire tor the beatific
vision.

The desire to see God directly, according to him, is

elicited and consequent on the perception of supernatural
ettects.

5

The tact that this interpretation is based on
.1,

supernatural effects and supposes therefore the existence of

Patrick K. Bastable, Desire
For
God, London,
,
............................

,

9

God removes its significance from the matter proper to this
paper.
Sylvester ot: Ferrara., however, holds that m.an's natural desire for the vision of the divine essence is a desire
for God not as object of beatitude but as first cause.
in

his theory, we ca.nnot know

Since,

na.tural rea.son that the

by

beatific vision is the supreme good of intellectua.l nature-we know only that God is the first cause--lt follows that our

natura.l desire 1s for vision of

~1S

divine essence

g~

first

caUSB, and gua object of supernatural beatitude. 6 Thus
sylvester holds a nat'llr'al desire for God based on knowledge
of effects.

This introduces one type of natural desire for

God which all schools of thought would admit, but Which many
would say does not go far enough.

It is based on the principle

that the intellect desires to !mow things perfectly.

To know

crea.tures perfeotly it must know their cause, and therefore,
desires to know God as first cause.

This is a natu.ral desire

of the intellect which, it must be noted, presupposes tiw

existence of God.

We shall treat this desire at greater length

in subsequent chapters.
John of
of Cajetan.

6

st. Thomas follows essentially the doctrine

The existence of the supernatural order is lmown,

-Ibid., ,38.

...

10

and from its effects man desires to
"The central point of John of

In~ow

God.

Bastable says:

st. Thomas' teaching is

~1at,

for st. Thomas natural des1re means a desire confonnable to
manls nature, since it is merely an application of the general
desire to know causes, and arises spontaneously on the perception of supernatural effeots." 7 Here, again, 1s evidenoe of
the natural desire of
John

tl~

intellect to know things perfectly.

of st. Tllomas also uses this natural desire of tl1.e intel-

lect to prove the nonrepU?;nanoe of the vision of the essence
of God.

His reasoning is simple.

Man's desire to see God is

the result of the natural activity of his mental life.
naturally desires to know things perfectly,

1.e.

Man

according to

their oauses, and therefore desires to know God who is first
cause.

Because this desire to know God 1s in conformity with

mants natural mental l11:e. he oonoludes that the desire is not
repugnant, although it is beyond the range of his natural powerS
Here again

lfEl

are dealing with an elicited OOSiIlEl and supposing

the existence of God.

This argu-7l1ent, to prove the nonrepugnance

of the beatific vision, differs, therefore, completely from the
eudaemonologieal argument.

For the latter 1s based on innate

desire and proves rather than presupposes the existenoe of God.

7
8

--

Ibid.,

-Ibid.,

40.
48.

11

It is evident, therefore, that mants natural aspiration to the
beatific vision on the intellectual plane differs from the natural aspiration ot man for God on Which the eudaemonological
argument is based.

The very existenoe of God is deduced from

the latter aspiration, while the former supposes it.
Duns Scotus, who was born approximately at the time
of st. Thomas' death, was the first philosopher to propound
and eXplain thoroughly th.e th.eory that man bas an innate desire

for God.

This theory was the logical result of his univocal

concept of being.

Because of his perfect precision, the con-

cept of being was predicated of God and man in exactly tho
same comprehension.

Scotus taught that the object of th.e human

intellect was being in its widest extension.

The divine

essenoe, therefore, became part of the primary object of the
intelleot, and man had an innate desire for the beatific
vision. 9
Dominicus Soto also taught that man has a natural
desire tor the beatific vision.
nate desire of the w111.

This, apparently, wa.s an in-

Because the bea.tific vision 1s the

only concrete objeot which can satisfy the rational appetite,
man tends naturally to that vision.

9

-Ibid.,

53.

He teaches that on the

12
le~el

•
of elicited desire the will is dependent on knowledge

and cannot therefore elicit a desire tor the beatific vision
of its own unaided power.
position in this way:

Bastable explains the logic of his

tiMan has a natural desire for the

beatific vision, even though he cannot, by his own w1aided
power, satisfy that desire.

For, the goal of a natural incli-

nation must be a definite concrete obj~ct,' and we cannot point
to any object outside of the beat1tic vision which would com...
pletely satisfy human appetite." 10

Both Soto's apPl"oach to

the problem of natural desire and his supposition are charaoteristic of those who favor the eudaemonological argument.
'rhe supposition 1s that the finalism of man's faculties is
explicable only in a term which satisfies them absolutely.
To speak of an absolutely satisfying term centers attention on
the only absolutely satisfying object we know of, rather than
on the nature of the rational appetite.
these aspects of the problem later.

We shall consider

Francis Toletu8, pupil of

Soto, followed his teacher in holding that man has an innate
desire for the beatific vision, although, in the present life
its possibility could not be demonstrated. 11
In the seventeenth century, Joannes Martinez de

..
10

ill,£••

57·

11

-Ibid.,

58.

.13
Ripalda reduoed the dootrine of innate desire for God to its
logioal oonolusion by shmving that it implied a transoendental
relation between human nature and the beatific vision.

This

introduction of a transcendental relation into the discussion
foreshadowed a modern sohool of thought professedly toaching
the existence of a transcendental relation between hunlan nature
and the vision of God.

We shall review this position later.

Ripalda himself followed the traditional Dominican teaching
on natural desire.
A century before Ripalda, Dominic Bannez had

fo~~

ulated what has become the standard Dominican position on natural desire tor God.
desire to see God.

Man, he said, does not have an innate
On perception

ot effects, man forms an

elicited desire to see their first cause.

This desire to see

God is elioited, conditional, and inefficacious.

The beatific

vision is not within the unaided powers of man. 12
Gabriel Vasquez was the first to introduce the idea
of the adequate object of the intellect.
Th~nas,

Like John of

st.

Vasquez believed that the beatifio vision is possible

beoause the elicited desire for it is the product of the natural working of the intellect.

He adds, however, as another

reason for the possibility of the beatific vision, the fact

12

-Ibid., dt..

that God is oontained within the adequate objeot of the intellect. 13

Exoept £or his theory of ~~ aotive obediental capac-

ity .. Francis Suarez tollows
tradition.

Ban.l'16Z

and the standard DO'minican

An innate desire is sirnply a metaphorical expres-

sion describing the relation of a potency to its act.

For

suarez, therefore, man having only an obediental capacity for
the vision of God, has no innate desire for that vision.

An

elicited desire is a real action depending on knowledge .. and
this is the desire that man has for the bea.ti.fic vision.

It

is an elicited, inefficacious, and oonditional desire, a. nd
would not cause a sense o£ frustration in a state of purely
natural beatitude.

14

1.Ihis point is of some significance be-

cause it emphasizes the fact that mants natural desire for God
is not at all natural in the sense of being an innate desire.
Were it a natural

L~ate

desire, a sense o£ £rustration would

necessarily result in a purely natural state.
According to Father Elter, S.J., the

A~sti~¥~

of

Jansen, which appeared in the year 1(::40, marked a turning point
in the history o£ natural desire for God.

Prior to that period.

the older scholastics had uniformly taught that tho only perfect beatitude man could have was the beatitic vision.

.....
13

14

-Ibid., 61.
Ibid., 60.

-

The

15
beatitude corJlatural to the rational appetite was beatitude
Jansen's argument forced Catholic writers into
-a positionquid.
radically different from the older tI'adition. Acsecund~

cording to Jansen, man has a necessary tendency to perfect
beatitude.

But the only perfect beatitude is the intuitive

vision of God.

Therefore, man has a necessary tendency to the

intuitive vision ot God.

There was a false premise here.

The

scholastics did not wish to question the firs'li premise, that
man has a necessary tendency topertect beatitude, so they
denied the second, that the only perfect beatitude was the
beatific vision.

15

The strength of the eudaemonological argu-

ment lies in the premise which the later soholastics did not
wish to deny, namely, that man has a. necessary tendenoy to
perfeet beatitude.

The possibility of a natural beatitude

beoame the important by-prOduct ot this argument over man's
na.tural desire for the beatific vision.

Of course, the impos-

sibility of a purely natural beatitude figures largely in the
eudaemonological argument.

One consequenoe of Jansen's teach-

ing was that the Augustinians were promptly accused of Jansenism when, in the eighteenth century, they taught a natural
dcaiI's for the beatific vision.

Unjustly censored, tlw

Augustinians taught that as far as appetition is concerned,

1949,

24.

15

Joseph Buckley, S.M.; Man's
Last End,
...............- ................
~

st. Louis,

man does naturally desire the beatific vision.

As far as a.t-

tai.ning that vision is concerned, however, man carmot natura.lly

aoquire it. 16

In the smne century that Jansen wrote, we find

the Dominican position well established.

Both Gotti and

Bllluart. the leading Thomists of the century, aeeep ted and
taught the traditional doctrine.

1\1an's desire to see God is

an elicited, conditional, and ineffioacious desire.
formally a desire to see the author of nature.

It is

This desire to

see God wou.ld cause no sense of frustration in a state of
purely natural beatitude.

B11luart points out that we oannot

prove that it is possible for

r~

to see God; manta desire

provides only a probable argument in support of his capacity

17

to see God.

Just prior to the beginn1ng of the present centu.ry
Dr. Seati11 wrote the first book dealing exclus1vely with the
problem of natural. desire for the baa-titic Vision.

lIe held

that man has an obadiental capacity for the beatific vision.
Because of this obediental capac1 ty, human nature is transcendentally related to the beatific vision.

The

trat~cendental

relation 1s in turn the cause of an elicited desire for perfect happiness which is implicitly a desire to see God.

-.- ...16

17

Bastable, _l'J_a...tur.;;;;;;,.a.;.;,~-. ~!:!., 66.
Ibid., 70.

This

17
elicited desire is not n free act but is forced by r:lan's nature.

Thus, man does not have an explicit desire, as Cajetw:l said, but
he does have an implicit desire for the beatific vision.

Expli-

oitly, man seeks perfect happiness. 'In freely elicited desire,
man is able to elicit a desire to see God because he 1s able to

elicit a desire for the vision of the first cause. 18 Sestilits
teaching that man necessarily and naturally desires absolute
beatitude is pertinent to the eudaemonological argument because
by

affirming that, be necessarily denies that a state of nat-

ural beatitude would be consonant with human nature.
With Rousse10t, whose theory on natural desire appeared in 1908, we have the beginning of the modern school
which distinguishes "the order of finality' from

tt

the order of

factual realization." and holds that these two orders do not
coinoide for man.

This distinotion harks baok to that of tho

Augustinians t between the power to desire and the power to acquire.

Man, acoording to Housselot, tends toward a goal-.

supernatural beat1tude--whloh

he

cannot reach naturally.

Rousselot held that the human intellect is so constituted that
it w111 never be at rest until it intuits reality. and, there-

fore until it sees all things in the essence of God. 19

18

!b~d.,

12.

19

-

114.

Ibid.,

l~

Following Rousselot, Guy de Broglie held that man's natural desire for beatitude 1s

i~plicitly

a desire to see God.

Since

the natural desire for beatitude 1s the ultimate end of indiv-

idual acts for beatitude, implicit in every act is the desire

tor God.

It is the same with the intellect's search for truth;

it is implicitly a search to see all things in God.

Finally,

the desire to see God connotes a velleity that is implicit and
necessary--necessarybecause it is implicit in every act. 20
Father Mar~chal further developed the distinction between the
order of finality and the orde;c> of realization by emphasizi11fj
the metaphysical tendency towards the beatific vision.

This

basic tendency is to a perfection beyond man's powers.

It is

natural in the sense that it is

Q

metaphysical urge, although

its fulfillment depends on the intervention of God. 21

l"ather

Laporta, O.S.B. reduced this metaphysical tendency to a transcendental relation.

He interprets natural desire in two senses

(1) It connotes the essential and necessary rela.tion
of a thing to its end. • • • and this is natural
ontological desire.
(2) It also connotes an action elicited by the appetitive faculty but determined by the nature possessing that faculty. And this is natural elicited
desire.

20
21

Ibid. 116.
-Ibid.,
119.
J

-

~---"- - - - - .
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•
Man has a natural desire to see God in the former
and not in the latter sense of natural desire.. He has
not a natural elioited desire to see God; for the
formal object of the will i8 bonulI1 in communi, and not
the beatific vision, and so tiia wflrdoes not necessarily desire this vision. But he has a natural ontologioal desire to see God; tor the beatific ~~slon is the
ultimate perfection or final end o:f man.
We find this position fully developed in the work of Father
O.Mahony, O.S.F.C.

In his book, .........
The Desire
or God, he assumes
...........---.... ......................

that man has a natural desire for the beati:fic vision and seeks
to solve the apparent contradiction of a natural desire 1:or an

object beyond the power of the nature.

His solution follows

the solution of l1ousselot, the distinction between th.e orders
of finality and factual realization.
• • • The metaphysical tendenoy of huma.:n natura
And, since nature
is the principle of actiVity, it follows that this
tendency is implicit in the higher activity or man,
and can be discovered by metaphysical analysis of the
naturej object and acts of his intellect and will.
The tendency of human nature, howevex- .. outstrips its
powers; for man has only 8.n obediental capacity for
the beatific Vision, and so, before the advent of
grace, the tendency of his nature is inefficacious. 23
is towards the beatific vision.

1.Vith 01Mahony we conclude our outllne of the history

of natural desire.

In the main we have fOUTld three general

positions, all of which vary considerably in detail and terminolog;y_

The first holds that man naturally desires to Imow

22

23

-

Ibid •• 120.

-Ibid.,

l24.

God only

1ndi~ectly.

A state of purely natural beatitude is

oonsonant with this position.
man

llat~ally

The second position holds that

desires to know God directly, but does not have

the power to do so.

Natural beatitude does not satisfy

nature, according to this position.

f.1a..'YJ.'S

Finally, the third posi-

tion holds that man naturally desires to l{Uow God directly
and has the power to do so.

Man, therefore, naturally desires

the beatifio vision.
With these facts concerning the relationship between God and the rational appetite in hand, we procoed now
to study the eudaemonological argument.

:1

1II1
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CHAPTER II

PRESENrrATION OF 'rHE EUDAEMONOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
We have reviewed briefly the history of natural
desire for God.

The eudaemonological argument is baaed on

that natural desire..

'l'hat term, however, is hardly univocal,

and so it is necessary to preface our presentation of tlw
argument with a clear definition of natural desire.

The term

natural desire.. connotes a ffcongenltal and abiding relation of
.....
a nature or faculty to a certain good--it is an ordo

tlalis

!£ bonum. !-llguo~/t

activity.

1 Human nature is a principle of

This principle Is in potency to the perf'ectiol1

which belongs to it by reason of its nature.

The tendency to

possess that perf'ection, we call natural desire.
dency operates on two levels.
movem~ent

This ten-

On the first level, the prtmary

of the will, the appetitive faculty of' the soul, is

a necessary movement.
object.

e~sen

It is independent of knowledge of the

The weight of nature, as we say, moves the appetite

to desire necessarily the perfection "Thich is natural to it.

1

Patrick K. Bastablo, D-.6_s.ir__
e
21

~~,

London,

22
.
This is natural desire in its striot sense, innate desire.

On

the level of elioited desire, however, the w111 under the influence of general impulse to seek the perfeotion of the nature
moves oonsciously under the direotion of the intellect to concrete, determined perfeotions.

The natura!

desir~

we use in

the eudaemonologieal argument is in the primary sense of the
te~l,

the innate, neoessary desire of the nature for the per-

feotion proper to it. 2

Buokley describes it this way:

Every potentiality is, of its very nature, an
intrinsic ordination to its natural fulfillment.
This order, ordination, and tendenoy of a potency
toward its fulfillmen't, toward the object that will
perfeot it, 1s oalled by Scholastics an appetite,
aERetitus naturalis. The sense of sight is a natural appetIte ?or color; materia Rruna is a natural
appetite for forma substantIalIs, and man's faoulties are a natux-al appe£ite tor" their perfeotion.
However, man can know the things toward which he is
tending and can st~ive for them consoiously. In
beings in whioh there is peroeption of attractive
objeots, there is a speoial penohant or tendency
toward them, distinct from the intrinsio ordination
of every potency ot the being to its proper act.
This tendenoy is an appetite, 1n the proper and
formal sense of the term. In act, this tendency 1s
a movement consequent upon the perception of a thing
as attractive. In potency, this tendency is a speoial faoulty of appetite; it is a power ot~movement
toward an attractive object as perceived. ~
It 1s the intrinsio ordination, therefore, of human nature

-,----1949, l26.

25.

2

;Cbip ••

3

Joseph Buckley, S.!iI.,

21f.Ul t s

~

End,

st. Louis,

-
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that 1s the foundation ot the eudaemonolog1oal argument.

The standard terms and definItions u ••d 1n the
.uC!,aemonolopteal

ar~ment

are these:

A~t1te,

as we l"..ave

Supernatural

••en, if'! an ordlnat1on of one thlnF to another.

appet!te 1s one prl")ceed1nrr trom a pr'ne1ple exoeedinp- and ele••tlnr natural powers.

Its.0pposlte 18 natural appetite whieh

i. prnper to the simple pnwer$ o,f a nat\~:re.

ftN'sturnl appe-

tite 1s nothtnp, more than an ot'CUnlltlon or relation to that
wb.1oh

~.a

8u1ten to itself, as, for instanoe, a stone seel-:8

1ts lO'Wef!t level

Clf

rest."4

Natv.ral appet! te is further"

divided tnto innate "ppet!te and elicited appetite.
appettte

',8 the necessary tendency of

t\n~r be~,nF

8\1'b-

Innate

tt\ the

T"~r

teet!.()n bef1tting '.ts nature and to the exeroise of its
proper activity_

knowledce.

It does not demand 1n the subject any previou8

E1101t~d QP~etlte

is the tendenoy 01' a knowlnp.

subJect to an objeot bet1.tt'.np the nature.
vlo\~.8

It follows pl'e-

eorn1tlon, and J.8 e1the", neoesfJ&:ry or free.

Tnnate

appetite, whioh 1s the t"'l8.'-n tern 1n our f!ttldy, i8 further
subdtvlded into exlp:ent appetite, an appetite whoae ob,ect 1e
proportIoned to the natttf'e and due to it, and apt1tudlnal

appetltul

4

De Vet-., q. es, 8.. 1. Nihil alh'.d est
quam quaedam lncllnatl0 et ONO ad allquam

naturan'i

rem slb1 convenientem, slent lapldem 1'err1 ad looum deorft1.tm.

!£peti~,

a..'l appetite for all object not contradictory to the

5

nature, but for which. the nature has :no strict right.

Beatitude
........
-_. is a term w::'lich will occur frequently.
haS been variously defined.

It

Boethius calls it: tlA state per-

fect in the possession. of every good. u

Thorl.las calls it:

"The perfect good which completely satisfies the appetite."

In other words, we are dealing hore with the oupron6 good
proper to the rational appetite and proportioned to it.

It is

the perfect and perpetual possession of every good necessary
to perfect and satisfy the rational nature of man.
Of especial importance to our argument is the definition of the objects of the faculties.

rrhe

fOfl'l1!!

obJ~<?~

of

a faculty is that aspect of the object that is attained first
and in itself and through which the faculty attains any other
Object.

Color, for instance, is the formal object of the

human eye, and inasmuch as a thi:nG is colored, it is a proper
object of the eye.

The material

obJe~

tained by reason of the forrnal object.

is that which is atst. Thomas describes

it:
There is in the object two aspects, the one
formal, the other material. The formal aspect of

Paris,

5 Pedro Descoqs,
1935, 137-145.

S.J. I Theologiae Naturalis, II,

·

.

------------------------......
the object i8 the relation of the objeot to the
potency or habit, and the material aspect is the
foundation of the formal, it we take the object ot
the faculty ot vision, for instance, its formal
object 1s color, or someth1ng ot that nature, tor
to the degree that something 1s colored, to that degree it i8 Visible, and the colored body is the
material object. 6
We have, f1nally, the proper object of a faculty, namely, that
object which does not exceed the capacity of the faculty and
can be atta1ned by it naturally.

The adequate object, as

contradist1nguished from the proper, 1s any object capable
of beIng attained by the faculty, by natural or supernatural
means, directly or indirectly.
In order to lay the strongest possible foundation
for the eudaemonological argument, we shall discuss at some
lenpth the evidence ot man's desire for beatitude.

This

discussion w111 be based on the thorough treatment of it by'
Sertillanges 1n his monograph on the knowledge of God,
~ources

Q!.f! Orolance

II, 549.

~ ~.7

!!!

Sertillanges gives three

6 S.D., B! g~., 7th ~d., Taurinena18, Rome, 1942,
In obj3Cto consldel~atu.r' allquld ut forntale at allquid

ut materiale. Formale autem 1n objecto est secundum quod
objeotum refertur ad potentlam vdl habltunt: materlale autem
Id in quo hoc tundatur; ut a1 loquamur de objecto potent1ae
v181vae objectum eiu8 formale est color, vel allquid hulusmodi,
1n quantum enim aliquid coloratum est, in tantum vieibile est.
sed materiale in objecto est corpus cui aocidit color.
!a~,

7 A.D. Sertl11anges,
Paris, 1913.

~

Sources

~

£!

Crolance

'rhe first is ::lan's

main points as evidence of this desil e.
g

desire of never-ending life in order to satisfy all of his de-

sires.

The second is the nature of mants intellect, which ex-

tensively and intensively always desires to know more and more.
~rhe

third is the fact of disorder connected with man's exist-

ence which serVes to emphasize his craving for unlim.ited happiness. 8

We shall examine those facts of common experience

more closely.
Jiilan desires never-ending life.

Poets, philosophers"

theologians bear witness to man's desire to have permanent possession of lite.

It is the bJ.'l6vlty of' life that captures the

imagination of' people in every age.
a day, a swift-running river.

Life is a shadow" a flmver

It is not permanent.

And it is

not the number of years of its course that maltes it so short.
Lengthen life's span to a thousand years; it becomes relatively
long.

How rapidly again it shrinks, however, with the realiza-

tion that it will necessarily end.

-

As Sertillangea says: UTout

2.!. gut dolt f1nir !l!.!.!l t!!ll.u 9 What man instinctively desires, then, is not a piece of life, but lite itself.
sires unending, indestructible being.

He de-

Man, touching the etern

beoause ra.ised above the materia.l swirl around him by his power

8
9

--

Ibid., 321.

-Ibid •• 332.
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Thus,

of thought, of reflection, wants eternity of being.

powerfully, the proponents offer a fact of universal experienoe to demonstrate man's desire for beatitude.

From. this ini-

tial fact, then, the proponent of the eudaemonological arGlxment
reasons in this way-

The desire just described is found in

every age, among all peoples, in every sort of cordi tion; it
reveals, therefore, the nature of man.

And because it is a

natural desire, it must reveal a natural object.

At this point

is introduced the prinoiple that such a natural desire oannot
be frustrated.

Aristotle, Plato, Cioero, Augustine, Thomas,

and all scholastic philosophers have
sire oannot be

f~~strated_

~eed

that a

~atural

de-

This does not mean, of course, that

every natural desire must necessarily be fulfilled.

Rather,

what is understood 1s that no such desire can absolutelz lack
L~

object.

At least, a real object must be possible.

Ob-

viously, therefore, if we grant the proponents of the audaemonologioal argument such a genuine natural desire for their eter-

nal object, we must grant them the validity

or

their aI"b"Umont

as a demonstration of the existence of God.
At this point we must emphasize the fact that the
euda.emonological argument is based solely on final causality.
It is essentially a sixth way of proving the existence of God,
absolutely distinct from efficient causality.

It would be to

28
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argue from efficient oausality wore we to say that 'l;;h1s natura.l desire must be caused by stHllo'l;hing eternal beoause it is

eternal.

But we argue from finality if we say that a natural

desire for an eternal object demonstrates the existenoe of that
eternal object beoause such a natural object cannot be frustrated.

The eudaemonological argument is based on finality.

The second

poL~t

man's rational appetite.

to be considered is the nature of

Man's appetite in its quest for sat-

isfaotion 1s satisfied only by the appearance of infinity in
the objeots it seeks.
it is because

tl~

Why is soience deified today?

man in the street seems to find hero some-

thing whose power is unlhuited, whose progress is

er~less.

scientists have told him to throw guns and God away.
has touched power in man that has no limit.
deified',

Perhaps,

Tl~

Soience

Why is the dictator

Because, again, the mixture of power and aocomplish-

ment seems unlimited.

So it is with love, with riches; the

union of both with infinity enllances them and makes mru1 dosire
them as ends in themselves.

At the same time, the finite na-

ture of these objeots explains the inevitable betrayal and disillusionment that results on disoovery of their limitations.

Their failure but elnphasiaes mants undeniable drive for the
unlimited.

------10

-Ibid., 376.

li'inally, we consider the disorder connected with
ma.:i'1 t

s existence.

L1 tera. ture, from

Gz-eeks to Gz-aham Greene,

"1;118

er:lphasizes the constant ex'ternal constraint of man t s milieu
and the utter insuf.ficiency 01' all that seems capable of' satisfying the real exigencies of desiz-e.

The rebuff man meets in

hiS physical milieu needs no profound investigation; it is patent.

Wrapped in the material world, part of it, depending on

it foz- sustenance and foz- protection, he finds that it continually revolts against his dominion.

His own body suffez-s the

blight seemingly stamped on all matter.

The intez-ior contra-

diction offered by the impotence of the intellect, by the weakness of the will, and by the Instabili ty of the irnagina"tion we
~~ple

evidence of the limitations which confront mants des1re

for the perfect life.

y""ideo mallors. probogue. deteriora. seguor.

l"inally, the insufficiency of' the things caloulated to satisfy
man's uz-ge foz- the full life greets us at every tUJ:'n.

Failure

where suooess is expected is disappointing, but when success
fails to fill, when the gold of expectation turns clay, then
it 1s that man finds the void of' desire has no bottom.

The

savant finds Imowledge enlpty; the soientist is appalled by vast
areas yet unexplored; the politioian finds no comfort in conquest.

After u.:.'1iting the German states and dominating the con-

tinenta.l political scene for deca.des, Bismax-ck sighs:

"How

little joy and satisfaotion the whole affair has brought me.

NO one loves me for it • . • • I have made no one happy, neither

myself nor my dear ones."

Thus man realizes the InsufficiellCY

of thi:.n.gs to satisfy his constant desire for perfect happiness.

Having thus described the natural desire of man, the
proponents of the eudaemonological argument offer the objeot
.hlch, they say, 1s alone capable of satisfying that desire.

The characteristics, they say, are determined by the nature of

man himself.

The object that satisfies that nature must neocs-

.arily be desired for itself.

W~ere

it desired i'or any other

reason, it would not be a final end and general motive for all
other desires.

All men must be al,le to attain it.

perfectly satisfy the rational appetite of man.
be exoluded i'rom it.
nent.

It must

All evil must

And finally, it must be stable and perma....

Since it is evident that no created thing could possess

these characteristics,

LYld

because some term must be postulated

tor mants natural desire--if, indeed it is a true natural delire they have drawn--the

tL~created,

necessary Good must be the

term of the desire. 12

There are many approaches to the eudaamonological
argument as outlined in general above.
tollow these patterns.

-

-

r£he more common ones

Mants natural and necessary desire for

Ibid .. , 348.
Franciscus Antonius Palmabo,

~~odlc~,

I,

R~~e,

beatitude is a necessary w1d natural desire for God as final
end..

God, therefore, must exist.

Again, God is the formal,

specifying object of the intellect and the will.

God, there-

Or, in the order of being, God is the proper,

fore, must exist.

specifying object of the human will since it necessarily tends
to God as to its end.

Even if' God, -therefore, is not the for-

mal object of the will as a faculty, still God must be the object of the will as a nature, for God is the proper term and
specifying object of th.e will as a nature. 13
We have considered rather thoroughly the fact of' a
desire for perfect happiness and have seen how this is used to
demonstrate the fact of God' as existence.
this desire is a natural desire.

We ask now whether

This, of course, i8 the basic

issue between the proponents and the adversaries of the argument.

How do we know that this desire is congenital to the

nature of man?

The proponents of the argument offer three char

acteristics of the desire to prove that it is natural.
of all, they say, it is found in all men.
fect happiness.

First

All men desire per-

History records the constant effort to excludo

all evil from life.

It is the history of every nation..

Expe-

rience teaches us and universal consent confirms the fact that
all men desire perfect happiness.

Ibid .. ,
13 -

228 ..

The desire is,

J~hel~efol"'a,

I

I
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universal.

Seoondly, this desire for perfect happiness is in

all menneoessarill.

This is, of course. a neoessity of speci-

fication, not of exercise.

A man. in other

word~,

may simply

abstain from the thought of happiness J but in the evel1t that he
does turn his attention to happiness. it is impossible for h±m

not to desire it.

Lessius describes it in this way:

It is not necessary that everyone thinks about
beatitude, nor that everyone that does consider it
elicit a desire for it. 14'01' the will is free and is
able to abstain from act1ng with regard to any object
whatsoever. It however 1<1; does actively consider
beatitude, it can only do so with love and desire
for it. It''or no one can truthfully and sinceztely sa'Y~
I do not desire to be happy; I wish to be unhappy. ~
F:1nally. this desire of perfect happiness which is in all men
is the cause of all their other desires and aspirations.

Pre ...

cisely because a man desires to be happy will he perform this
or that act which he believes will lead to the happiness he
desires.

Notewo.rthy is the fact that this general intention

need not be formally expressed during the performance or any
particular act.

Possibly it will be only implicit and virtual.

One man, for instance, may conceive his happiness to be located
in a particular place.

III using all the means he knows to put

himself in that place. he may not explicitly think of it, but
it will nonetheless be the virtual cause of each act leading to

final possession ot the place.

14

~., 229.
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The desire for beatitude, th.erefore, 1e universal,
----=-:.-~.~

is necessary, is the causs of all other desires, and acoording
to the proponents ot the eudaemonological argument is shown by
these characteristics to be natural, i.e., radicated and based
in nature itself.
We cOIlSider. finally, the impossibility of frustra-

tion for a natural desire.

The principle that no natural de-

sire can be vain is universally valid, says Dascoqs, under the

- ....-

following conditions.

Such a natural desire need not de facto

be completed; it must admit the possibility of bei:ng completed.

This possibility of completion, furthermore, must be a positive
possibility in the order of nature.

And the means of achieving

the end must be supplied by nature.

The fact that some moral

or physioal disorder may frustrate the end does not negate the
principle.

The natural desire, finally, must be an innate,

necessary tendency.

It may be eliCited, but it tns:y not be free

or elective. 15 Granted these qualifications, we argue to the
impossibility of frustration either trom the nature of finality
or from analogy.

~he

extrinsic causes of being are the effi-

cient cause and the final causel the .former determ1ning

-

thing is, the latter determining what it is..

15 Descoqs,

Theolosi~e

NaturaliSt

~

a

Palumbo describes

158.

r
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the final cause in the se tel"lnS:
Every agent necessarily acts ro~ a determined end.
lIe tends, that is, to a dete~nined effect which is
suitable to h1m. and perfeota h1m. Some good, therefore, as end it 1s which determines the agent to act
rather than to abstain trorp. acting and to seek this
end rather than IL'1.otb.er. 10
Such is the nature ot the final cause.

In the present instance

we are considering a natural desire tor beatitude.

That is,

in the operation ot the rational appetite that which determines
the agent to act and that Which determines the end of the act
is the tinal cause, beatitude.

Beatitude is, therefore, essen-

tial to the <>perat1on ot the rational appetite because without
it the appetite remains undetermined either to act at all or

to any speoific act.

By denying the final cause, the nature

is necessarily destroyed.
Arguing trom analogy, we find that in brute an:Lm.als
every natural desire has its proper end.

For heX'bivoX'ous

animals there 1s plant life; for carnivorous animals, meat.
'I'his natural disposition of objeot and appetite ls, ot course,
in no wise upset by the fact that aocidentally in one instance
or other the natural end ot a creature may not be available,
as is explained above.
J

Allalogously, then, we say that were man

J

16 Palumbo,

T~~odleea,

226.

r
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urged on to perfect happiness by all the foroes of his na.ture
and yet of all creatures alone deprived of a satisfying term,

he would certainly be more miserable than brutes and even
inanimate lite itself. 11 F'rom the nature or finality and
frolU analogy, consequentl1, we say that no natural. desire can
be frustrated.

The traditional form of the eudaemonological argu-

ment 1s given in this wa1 bY' Palumbo:
We have a natural desire for perfect beatitude,

or a natural desire to obtain a supreme and perfect
good, which can sat1sfy all the needs of our soul.

& Such a. natural desire cannot be inefficacious.
Ergo: There must exist a supreme and perfect good as

the term of our de sire.
& Such a suprem.e and perfect good must be infinite J
that 1s, God.
8

Ergo: God does exist. 1

17
18

-

Ibid.•• 22.5.

!bid., 222.

CHAPTEH III

EUDAE:MONOLOO leAL ARCH.n;IENT

Positions of adversaries of' the eudaamonological
argument vary considerably.
all; others are willing to

Some concede it no validity at
gr~~t

some probable validity.

We

shall indioate the main points of thea. dissentillg positions
in this ohapter.

We want a clear picture of the opposition

to the argument as it 1s proposed in Ohapter II.
A brief review of the nature of the intelleot and

will will serve to clerify the basia issues and bring us immediately to the heart of the matter.
ural desire in a rational being.

We are dealing with nat-

Beca.use that ra.tional being

acts through its faoulties, it is the faculties that reveal
what does and what does not belong to the nature of the being.
The adversaries scrutinize very closely, therefore, the makeup of the intellect and will.

We consider first of all the

various objects of these two faoulties.

The1 are three: the

formal object, the proper object, and the adequate Object.

'rhe formal objeot of a faeul'ty is that objeot whioh defines
the activity of that faoulty, to whioh 'the faculty is assentially ordered, and which it neoessarily attains in every aat.

36
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If God, for instanoe, were the formal object 01' the h.uman will,
granted the existence of the will, .: t would 00 irnpossible for
God not to exist.

At the

same t1.'Ue, because of the nature of

this formal, speoitylng object, it 1s olear that this is the
only objeot which allows sueh a oonelusion.

Here we appl.y the

metaphysioal. prinoiple that nothing natural can be absolutely
frustrated.

Granted, therefore, an essential ordination of

faculty to objeot, that objeot must exist or the nature of the
faculty 1s frustrated.
V{hat, then, is the formal objeot ot' the intellect'!

Even those who defend the validity of the argument answor that
the forrnal objeot of the hwuan intellect is beips
In other Vlorda, that wh1ch 1s known first

being in the widest extension of the word.

£uld

!E.

a;eneral.

in ltsel1' is

Maher says:

ll"~\!lth,in

the sphere of being is inoluded substance and accident, body

and spiI1it, creator and creature, actual and possible reallty;
in fact, everything capable of being in any mea.sure undeI'.
stood." 1

In extension, therefore, the formal. object of the

huma.n mind, being in general, does include God.
And, secondly, what is the proper and speclfyin.g
object of the human intelleot"

1

Again, all agree that the

1&1cha81 Maher, S. J ., P slcllologZ, 9th ad. J

New York, 1926, 305.
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propel' object of the human intellect is the abstract and universal essences of sensible or material things.

Maher puts it

neatly: "But, although the formal object of th,e intellect embraces all forms of

bei~3'

yet the hmnan intellect has for its

cormatural, ilUCllediate, or proportionate object, the abstract

and universal essenoes of sensible or material thlngs .. n2

In

treating of the proper objeot of the intellect, there is question of those things toward which the intellect tends directly
as opposed to objec.ts whieh it can know only medIately or indi-

rectly.

Thus God and pure spirits are not proper objects of

the human intellect, th.ough, supposi:n,g their eXistence, they

are contained within the scope of its formal object.
~o

clarity immediately the relation bemveen

human intellect and God,

this fashion.

ll'U';Ult

3

tl~

knowledge of Hira. is attained in

Man cannot intuit directly the divine essence.

The proposition "God exists" is not immediately evident as far

as we are concerned.

Our idea of God" theI*efore. is analogous

as opposed to proper.

All of our ideas originate in objects

on the sensible level.
terent perfections.

By abstraction man forms ideas of' dif'"

These are proper cOl1Oepts.

iJow, by ne-

gating all il1tperfectlon in thesa concepts and by predicating

2

-

Ibid., )06.
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them of God as pure perfection man can represent the divine
essence, not, indeed, properly but at least analogously_
At this point it

~uight

be tvell to d1.stinguish the

formal and prO'puI' objects of th.e intellect i'rom its adequate

object.

t.rho former pertain only to the natural order; the

latter to the supernatural order after the elevation of the
faculty by grace.
What is the fornHiil object of the will'?
object of the will 1s scod

!!! wm.eral.

The i'orr:la.l

tEhia universal concept

includes all possible good; it is Good conceived abstract;ly a.s

unlimited good.

In extension this object must includo God..

Ha.ving reviewed the nattU'>0

or

tile objects of intel-

lect and of wlll, we are in a position to cOllsider th.e arguments brought against the eUdael1l0nologlcal argu..."OOnt ..
li 'rom

OUIt

de£'inltions of the proper and formal objects

of the intellect it is clear that although a concrete, infinite
good possibly is contained in tho orbit of -the .t'orm.al object
of the intelleot, the proper and cOlJ.natural object of that

faculty offers no oonolusive evidonce of it.

That proper ob-

ject is restricted to sensible, material things.

AgaLn,as we

stated just above, the formal object of the will embracing all
good !:lust include God, the infinite good.

of the eudaemonologioal

arg~~ent L~slst

But the opponents

that prior to u demon-

r---------.
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stration of the actual existenae of God, the fact catll10t be
de31onatl~a.ted

that such an ir..finite good is actually verifiod

in some concrete being.

Since we ha.ve no proper concept of

such e. being, no real argument beyond mere gratuitous assump-

tion can be offered to show tbat this tendency to good in gonaral includes the tendency to a concrete 1nfinite good.
strictly spaalting,

thi';~refore,

neither the 1"01'1aa1

object of the intellect nor the fomal object of the vlill diaclose a natural tendency to a concrete infinite good.

In this

fact the opponents ot.' too Gudaemo.nological argwnent of'fer one

strong reason for qUGstionlng the fact itself of a. na.tural
desire for absolute beatitude.

What is evident from an e:xami-

nation 01'[;11& fa.eu.lties, according to the adversaries, 1s that

man's natural and neo6ssa:ry tendency tor happIness is all appe-

tite for universal good rather than a conerete, infinite good.
It is a good conceived abstractly as an

~~11mited

good.

There-

fore t before the existence ot God is establishad t says P alw'7l.bo"

that such a good is verified in some conerete being cW1nOt be
proved •

.3
In the face ot th.e analysis just given, defenders

of the argument propose a distinction..

3

Palumbo, Theodicea, 299.
•••

J

Granted that God is

r------------------~
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not the 1"01'1':1&1 or proper objec t of the racul ties in tho order
of aotivity, could he not be the object of those faculties in
the order of being'?

Rere we have the faniliar distinction be-

tween the intellect and will considered. as faculties a..'1od the
intellect and will considered as na·cures. 4 And so, runs the
argument, granted that infinite good and infinite being are
not the objects of the intellec t

8.l1d

will as faculties, .none-

theless they are the formal and specifying objects of those
faculties insofar as they are natures.

'.rne cause of man t s

tendency to the infinite 1s the infinity of God to which,
~

nature, the will is ordered.

otherwise the will would be

!?l

God must, therefore, eXist;

D!-turall~i

frustrated.

In other

words, God is the form.al and proper object of the w.lll as a

nature.
"

The adversaries of the argument reply quite sintply
that the distinction between the 1It11l as a faculty and the will
as a nature bas

110

foundation.

For wh.atever is said of the

one must be said of the oth.er; the capacity of the
frOl'Tl

the capacity of the otoor.

OXle

is kn.own

consequently, if God can.not

be the object of the will as a faculty, He oannot be the objoct

of the will as a nature.

4

-

Ibid., 2)0.

And with this distinction the advor ...

•
saries of the argument insist time and time again on the prin-

ciple: the infinite gOOd cannot be the formal and propel'> object
of any created thing.

Here 1s how Mal1Ser puts it:

When a faculty is naturally ordered to the
proper object of its nature, thare ought to be a
natural proportion between the raoult;r and the object. • • . This principle is valid for our human
intellect, for our will. * • • Rence there should
be a natural equity between the faculty and its
natural object, a certain likeness of nature and
form. How is it possible then to have that likeness betweenc::'God. • .and the human intellect and
will. • • • :;I

Again, the adversaries note, the fact that the i'ort1al
Object of the will contains the idea of infinite good in no way
helps the validity of tb.e argument.

It is from other sources

we know that such an idea is contained in the universal scope

of good in general.

argument

The precise point of the eudaemonological

is to pI*ove that it is contained in that idea illde-

pendent of any other proof.
Some adversaries of the argument base their objac-

tion on the nature of an elioited appetite.

In the natural

desire for beatitude we are dealing with an elicited appetite •
•
~

,

,

Desoogs, 172 .. La ou une puissanoe est naturel1ement ordo.nnee £: I Fobjet propre do sa nature, i1 doit yav01r
una proportion naturelle entre 1a ;eulssance et ltobjet • • • •
Oe principe vaut pour notre volante humaine, pour notre intelligence • • • • 11 doit done 1 avoir entre una puissance at son
objet naturel une connaturalitas, uno eom.munauta de nature et
de torme.. Nous demandons alors comment cette cor:rmunaute peut
atre. possible entre Dian • • • at l'intelligence ou 190 volont~
humaine.
:;I
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Now. in order to have an elicited appetite of aJ:lY object a.t
all.. the intellect must rirst know a:nd present that object to
the will.

Consequently, if the will Vlould tend neoessarily

to an infinite good, God, it is necessary that the intollect
should preconceive that infinite object as existil1g and as
necessQ.%'y to obtain perfect happiness"

Knowledge of God neces-

sarily preoedes the existence of the apPetite 1'or Hint as the
ultimate end of the appet1te.

Too existence of God, thorei'ore,

according to Palumbo, is a presuppositIon and not a consequa.nce
of the appetite. 6

Perhaps the most recurrent objection to the eudaemonoloC; cal argument is that emphasizing the lack of proportion between the intellect, the wIll, and transcendent Good.

We have the finite nature of these faoulties contrasted to the
infInite nature of wbat tbG proponent. of tite argument would
oall the natural object.

Something &ssentia.lly finite is

paired off with something 1nf1nlte.

ject to is evident.

What the adversaries ab ...

The rattonal faoultles are not propor-

tioned to such an objeot, and this is true even if the object
is granted to exist.

Elicited acts for beatitude cannot pro-

ceed from the human intellect and. will for this is an object

6

Franeiscus Antonius Palurllbo, 'rheodieea, :ears Prilll8.

Rorne, 194,2, 228.

.._"

,

•
in such a way that they manU'est an essential need of tb.ose

faculties.

At most, they can demonstrate an inefficacious

desire, and, of course, tho actual existence of such an object
cannot be proved from an inefficacious desire. 7
r.creating this matter of proportion, Palumbo is quite
He states that since the will for its part is finite

strong..

while its direction in this instance is to an lnfinite object
which completely exceeds its natural capacity, the whole argu-

Ulent is seemingly based on the sU"pposition that the will is a
divine

faeu~ty.

This 1s the supposition most of the adver-

saries of the argument attack.

They argue that the result of

this hypothesis would be to make the human intellect and will
tend positively to an intuitive vision of the infinite wld to
a real, essential possession or it on the purely natural plano.
If' the need were absolute. if our nature were utterly unintelligible without it, we might argue to the need of such a. term.
l{owever, this conclusion, say the adversaries, is not only
improbable, but it seems absolutely impossible since hUUl8n

nature seems altogether unproportloned to such

&"1 el1d.

8

To avoid holding an explicit desire for en object

7 Pedro Deseoqa, S.J., Ppaelectlo1les Irheologiae
Naturalis, Tomus Secundus, Paris, I93!;, 153.
1IfI7~"""

8 Palumbo, '.ch.eod1cea., 229.

r~--------------------------------~
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olearly not proportloX'led to the faculty, the proponents of the
argument make this oase.

The absolute good in questIon Is not

known by way of abstractlon, but, rather, the will im.mediatelyalthough Implleit--deaires that absolute Bood as real and as
ooncrete.

Now this seema to hark back to the distinction men-

tioned above between the will as a nature and the wl11 as a

faculty.

The answer 1s the same.

revealed by its acts.
it does.

The nature of anything Is

We know the nature of a faculty by what

On the one band we have a finite nature; on the other

an infinite term.

What positive proof. the adVersaries repeat,

Is there that the former is able to tend to a real possession
of the latter?

The only proof offered 1s the desire itself

Which 1s quite possibly purely subjective and 111usory.

It is

precisely the distance betweem sucb a fln! te fa.culty and the

infinite term that is the crux of the matter.

This is the dis-

proportion the adversaries corlla back to as the foundation of
their objections and the cause of their mistrust of the argumente

In spite of the faot that the formal objects of the
human intellect and w111 offer little support to the argument.
In spite of the disproportion between the finite and the infinite, the fact yet remains that man does as a matter of uni-

versal experience have a

strol~

tendency toward absolute sat-

r~--------------------------------~
On that tendenoy it is th.at the strength of the

isfaotion.

argument rests.

If' those who 'propose the strongest argwllents

against this proof' for the existenoe of God seem to bend over

backward to preserve its va11dity--wltness Desooqs after two
soore pages which tear it apart bit by bit, attesting to its

apologetio value--it is the very force of the universal tendenoy to absolute satlst'action that breeds this philosophic
reluo tane e •
Deseoqs br1ngs matters mostly ·to a head by reduoi.rAg
to three the oriteria which test t he validity of' the universal

tendenoy to absolute satisfaotiorl as a prootfor the exiatonce

of God.

To prove the possibility of tile infinite Good from

such a tendenoy it 1.8 neoessary either (1) to see that the
Infinite is positively possible in Itself, or (2) to see its
nature tmmedlately in itselt·-o.ntologism,

o~

(3) to

that

SGe

the motl.on toward indefinite good would not 00 intelligible
~

in the unity of transcendental good, but only in transeendent

Good. 9

In treating the third hypothesis, Descoqs comes to

the heart ot his argument.

The defenders olaim that an in-

finite series in final causes is equally as repugnant as
infinite series in effioient causes.
necessary as an effioient cause..

A final cause

_8

~1

as

Consequently, there mur£rt

be a final term which corresponds perfeotly to the potency

9

Desooqs, Praeleotiones.
.......,..1&
••
• _ ..

166.

r
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and the capacity of the nature.

Irhere must exist, therefore,

a term which corresponds to the natural appetite for beatitude
found only in transcendent Good.

Vescoqs' answer .. -and it

forces to the surface the basic issues in the minds of the
adversaries of the argument··ls this.

Such a natural appetite

rllust have its proper end only if the ontological order has

already been established.

Again, in the. purely logioal order

such an appetite must be satisf.1ed only if a .first efficient
cause has been proved.

However, in

too

purely 10g2.0&l order

until a first efficient cause haa been proved, the necessity
of such a term is conceded by Descoqs only with probabl11ty.10

In rejecting th.e eudaemonologioal argument, Desooqs
follows, in the main, the line of diffioulties we have already

stated.

In the first plaoe, the tendency itself is not such

that only the transoendent term e:cll possibly explain it.
Secondly, tbe disproportion between the nature of the faculty

and the nature of the term makes certitude highly questionable.
Thirdly, neither the will nor the intellect requires in its

formal object such a term.

And finally, the term of the fae-

ulties oan be explained satisfaotorily in another way.
A tinal matter to be eonsidered in conneotion with

10

Desooqs,Praelectlolles,
. ... 167 •

the position of the adversaries is their explanation
dynamism of the intellect and -the will.
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We can introduce the

problem with this question proposed by defenders of 'the argu-

ment: how can the objeot which. directs the tendencies ot the

will be an abstract object?
plies simple good.

'.rhe good as such necossarily im-

And if goodness as such. (bonwil. ~~) 1s

the object of the will, that object necessarily implies absolute good (bon~ !...1m.;eliolt!£.)

Adversaries of the argument

find the answer to this proposition in a further analysia of

the mechanism of the Vllll.

trhat tb.e formal object of the wtll

1s goodness in general is evident.

That this formal object

necessarily iiTlp11as absolute good is not evident.

The formal

object is the aspect under which a concrete determined object
1s desired..

r1'he object of the human will remains finite,

indefinite. and concrete..

The will itself terc:lna.tl:rl[; always

in its formal objeot, the good, need never be absolutely
satisfied. 11

The fact that we constantly rise above tho goods

which we do gain, say the ad~"ersarie5. does not necessarily
W/~~

mean that this tendency of the" must end in trL:.Iscendent 13 00 0.,
but simply that we retain the liberty of the good in General.
rthat is, that we oontinue to act freely.

11

Descoqs, Praelectiones, 181.

r.Ehat £!Qodnoss does
Q

r
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not of course exclude transcendent aood, but from the mechan-

ism of the will itself such an object cannot be proved.

Each

particular act of volition and intellection has its sufficient
reason in the continued freedom. to consider finite objects
under the aspeot of the true and the good.. the aspect under
which !llan' s faculties attain their material object.

Concerning the f1na.lism of a tendency to the indefinite, Descoqs bas this to say:
C8..L"l

It is true that no finite good

satisty the desire of man for beatl. tude 11' one suppose

beatitude to be a static oondition.

But could not that desire

of man be satisfied by a dynamic pursuit of finite, everrenewed goods?

The nature ot the desire leads man always to

the finite, indefinite good.
city never filled.

The indefinite implies a capa-

The very la.ck of satisfaction 1s a condi-

tion of our activity_

HOW' is it possible, therefore, to con-

clude with certitude that the tend.ency to beatitude--to Which
our faculties are 1n no way proportioned--must have for its
term an infinite. positive good'? 12
In conclusion, it 1s well to note that we are not
concerned here with the validity of the principle
tials nature cannot be

12

defeetive.~l

It

In essen-

It is ad."llltted that the

Deseoqs, Praelectlones,
183.
.,.
"' ...

r
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princ iple of sufficient reason requil"'6s us to reoo6::1ize the
equal validity of the prinoiple of final causallty with that
of effioient causality.

there must be a term

GrM.ted a positive natural tendency,

cOl~·esponding

make human nature unintelligible.
of' fact.

to it.

To deny this is t,O

The basic difficulty is one

Does an analysis of our natural tendenoies reveal

that we do tend to a good that is positive, transoendent, and

concrete, so that there must exist a term corresponding to
that natural desire?

The validity of the eudaomonologlcnl

argument rests on the answer to this question.
would have to be objectively possible.

.suoh an. object

That is, the object's

souroe would have to be the concrete finite

ol:~der

since there

is no apriori foundation .for it in the dynamism of tho will.
It would have to be subjectively possible.

Soma proportion

would have to be proved between the finite faculty and the

infinite object.

•
CHAPT1~~H

IV

We have weighed the eudaemonologieal argumen.t rather

thoroughly.

Its strong po1nt Is the insistent craving of

for unlimited happiness.
desire.

r:lan

This oraving Is called a natural

By natural desire we understand rul ordination of the

rational appetite toward its natural object.

This ordina.tion

is an appetite in the forma.l sense of the term, i.e. perceptiOn of' the proper object and motion toward it.
presents the object; the will deslres the object.

The intelleet

Inasrllueh as

this desire for happiness is a natural deSire, it cannot fail
of' its object.

No truly natural desire can be vain.

the term of the desire 1s beatitude,

~~d

Because

therefore God, the

existence of God follows necessarily !'rom the fact of the

ural desire.

1:'"!l1t-

This, in outlule, is the proposed sixth way of

demonstrating the existence of God.
The adversaries of this eudaemonological argur:l.cnt
do not question the metaphysical

oel.~taillty

of the principle

which affirms the impossibility of absolute frustration in a
des:i.re of this kind.

1"01" do they deny the infinite capacity

51
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of the ratIonal appetIte.

'l'na ro.oot point lies in thb formal

and proportioned object of that appetite.

From the propor-

tioned object of the appetite 1s it possible to demonstrate
with certitude the existence of God?

What is the real, pro-

portioned object of the rational appetite from which we can
define its natural desire?

The adversaries etnphasize the lack

of pl'oportlon between the finite faculty· and the infinite object proposed by the eudaemonological argument.
We shall exam.ille carefully the principle issues in

the present chapter.

We shall review tbe partieular arguments

of authorities on both sides.

'lie shall give a S\..'U'Ih"l1.S.ry of the

critical issues at the end of the chapter and attempt some
d$finl te conclusion based on this study.
The investigation will necessarily earry us into

the current dispute about natural desire for the beatific

vision.

Only indirectly w111 that discussion of the correct

interpretation of t he texts of
present problem of a sixth way.

st.

Thomas oontribute to the

It might be well to preface

our use ot matter taken trom that eontrover.sy by remarking
that whatever use is made ot it w111 not prejudge the problem
of the oorreot interpretation of Thomas, nor will it presup-

pose the correctness ot any particular opinion.

53

•
It will be advantageous to olear up several ooncepts

at the outset of this chapter.

We single out first for olar-

ifioation the distinction between the metaphysical and the psychological orders.

What do we mean by the metaphysical order

as distinguished from the psychologioal order?

'rhe meta.phy-

sioal order is on the third and highest level of abstraction.

It considers being a.s such, the relations that exist, there-

fore, between being created and uncreated.
order, on the other hand, is on

tl~

The psychological

first level of abstraction.

In the case of man, it abstraots from the individual and considers all the causes of movement and especiaJ.ly the self
movement that oomes from. rational appetite..

In the metaphys-

ical order, then, man is considered as related to a.ll being
and as passively moved in rela.tion to them.

In the psyoholog-

ical order man is considered as related to an end which he
consciously chooses as proportioned to his faculties. l

In the

metaphysical order man's action and goal are determined by God.
Ma.n 1s passive.

In the psychologica.l order, oonsequent on the

general movement of God" man determines himself.
tive.

r~an

is ac-

Concerning th1s distinction, Bueltley says:
• •• In the metaphysIcal order, we may considoras
partIcipated beings the created goods which man desires,

1

1949, 97.

Joseph Buokley, S.M.,

~ant~ ~ ~,

st. Louis,

r
which derive their goodness trom the goodness of
God; so that Inconsidering the objects man desires, not as man desires tl~m but as they are in
their metaphysical implications, we may say that
in desiring created goods, man desires God, in
whose goodneas these created goods share. • . •
In the psyohological order, on the contrary, man
is considered aotive and. cOl'lseious, tending toward
an end viewed as adapted to man's powers and neor;
'seen, in other words, from man t s point of view.

In one instance, consequently, God determines the fllovernent of
man; in the other, man determines the movement of man.
the two movements identical or different?

Are

As far as the move-

ment itself is concerned, they are the same.

The formal ob-

ject, however, of the movement may be different.

Buckley

explains the distinction this way:

God could not create anything except for the sake of
His own goodness. But, if Godoreated all things
for the sake of .His goodness as end, then all things
are ordained to God's goodness as their end. This
does not mean, however, that creature.s eitner should
tend toward Godls goodness as such by conscious aot
or do so by natural appetite. The purpose of an
action and corresponding passion, or reception of
the action, are identical in re, not necessarily in
aspect.)
---On the metaphysical plane, therefore, the divine goodness is
the efficient, the exemplary, and the final cause of avery
being"

Every movement toward any of these oreated participa ...

tions ol' the dIvine goodness is, on that plane, an eXplicit

2

98.
-Ibid., 99.
Ibid.,

-

movement toward the divine goocuJ,esa.

•
On the psychological

plane, on the other hand, the same movement is explicitly de-

termined by the intention of the rational appetite, in the
case ot man, and this mayor nlay not be the divine goodness.
Buckley puts it clearly:
Man 1s moved by nature--this .first and funda-

mental act of the will 1s natural and necessary-·
toward good in general (object) and beatitude in
general (end.) By virtue ot this first movement,

man moves himself toward particular good objects,
choosing and deteI'minlng in what he is to seek h1s
beatitude. It man is Nally to satisfy and fulfill
his natural cravings and powers (man as t?,at,;1ens) 11
he must, indeed, direct himself (man as !!Sen,s)
toward those values which respond to his natural
and reasonable tendencies. But, as a free agent,
man 1s able to set his choice on mel'e apparent
goods and false values. There is no psychological
nor even moral necessity .for man to adopt in his
actions the same point of view as God. has with
regard to the purpose of man f s ac t s. 4
The importance and Significance of this distinction is obvious.
The va.lidity of the eudaemonological argument must be established on the psychological plane.

At the same time .. the

temptation to sidle into the metaphysioal order is attractive.
Beoause the l'elation of the mind to Gad is, in part,
the focal point of the present diSCUSSion, the second matter
tor study 1s man's knowledge of God.

The knowledge or contem-

plation ot God is ot varying kinds and degrees.
that common to the majority of men.

4

-

Ibid., 102.

It is

The first 1s

cor~used

and subject

r
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to error.

The second, scientific in its approach, is acquired

by demonstration.

It 1s a tully rational approach to God and

reaults in a negative ....positive concept telling us what God is
not.

The third is on the higher level of faith and revelation.

It affords us posl tive knowledge of God.

'rho tourth is the

knowledge of God that is proper to pure spirits and disembodied
souls.

And, finally, the most perfect of all knowledge, that

of direct vision of the dIvine essence.

Of these ways of'

knowing God, the first three are proper to man in his present
condition.

Since the eudaemonological argume.ut is strictly

on the philosophical plane, the third way of faith and
tlon is not pertinent.

revela~

Ruling out the first type, that of the

confused knowledge, we find that the present disoussion concerns itself with the IJocond kind of knowledge of God.
is the properly rational approach to liim.

That

The heart of the

ugument is to analyze the relation between the mind--an.d
therefore the rational appetite--and Qod. 5
Any discussion

ot the validity

01' the eudaemonolog-

1eal argument centers sooner or later on the formal objects

of the intellect and the w1.ll and more part.eularly on tbC
precise meaning of these objects, universal good and universal

5 Antoninu$ Finili, o.p. t "Natural Deslre,tl
Dominican Studies,
Oxford, I, October, 1948, 319.
,
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truth (bonum
universale. at
universals.) L1::1iting our
........
..
.......... varum.
--..-..........
discussion to the will for the moment, we have three possible
~vers~!

interpretations of the term

versal good in the order of being
That 1s, subsistent good, God.

soo:!.

(bon~

It may mean uni-

universale

.!B !ssando.

AgaIn, it may be universal

good in the order of predication, which by reason of its exten-

sion 1s predicated univocall,. or analogioally of any good.
This 1s the bonum

~~iversale ~ predic~do.

Finally, it

~ay

mean general universal good, whioh is the formal object of the
will.

This is the bonUt,!! unlversal~

!a sener,e. 6

Too necessity

of care in using the term. universal 600S is apparent.

If'

We

define the tendency of the rational appetite by the universal

good in the order of being" God, that ls, there oan be no dispute about the validity ot the eudaemonologieal argumont.

However, the universal good referred to as the object of tho
w111 18 not the .b.o.num
..

~~1ver$ale

!n

essend2; it is not the

bOnum universal! ~ pyedlcan.do, which is the logical universal;

it is the
sal.

!!.on~ univ~rsa.f~

!!!

Buckley desoribes 1t as

g~Jqere,

n good

the metaphysioal univer-

in the un,1versality of its

analogical character." 7 In other words, whatever object is

.
6 Buokley,

M~1'a

Last End, 128.

;;...;;,;;;;;;.;....;;;.---
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the

tEn"!,!

of an act of the will, that object 18 chosen tmder

the aspect of good.

And in the seale of being, everything

that is talls under the scope ot this

fo~nal

object of the

will either directly or analogic'al1y.
Finally, we subject to clarific·ation once again the
objects of the rational appetite.

We have defined the !ormal

0i?.1ect as the particular aspecit under which the faculty at ....

tains its object.

As explained a.bove, being in general 1s

the formal object of the intellect; good in general is the
formal object of.' the will.

The proper objec1i is 'that object

which is proportioned to the powers of the faculty in its
given condition.

For the intellect this proper object is the

essence of a material thing; for the will it is any good thus
presented by the intellect.

Finally, the adequate object of

the faculty comprehends the complete extension of the capacity

ot the faculty.

For the intellact anything in thB seale of

being 1s embraced 11_ its adequate object; the will led by
the intellect 1s equally universal.

The Significance of these

distinctions lies in this) that the present discussion is limited to the proper and proportioned object ot the rational
appetite.

That God 1s included in the adequate object of the

intellect is

t~e.

But the very point of the eudaemonological

argument is to demonstra:te, independently of any other proof,
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that such a determined conoept does belong to the indeter-

mined range of the adequate objeot ..
To summarize these introductory remarks then, we
are trying to ascertain the validity of a sixth way which is
based on the natural desire of rational. appetite in its present oondition.

The argument is based on the proportioned

Object of the faculty; it 1s on ths psychological plane;

finally_ the formal object of the rational appetite Is bonum
universals in ganer.!.

These

~e

the conditions on which the

proof is based.
The adversaries of the eudaemonological argument

stress in partioular two points..

The first is the lack of

proportion between the finite faculty and the infinite objeot
if we olaim a natural desire tor God.

rrhe second Is the

nature of the formal and proportioned object itself..
objeot is not God.

How do

too

r£hat

proponents of the argu.ment

handle the difficulty of lacit of' proportion?

Lagrange presents one way of doing it.

Garrigou-

We shall review the

theory 01' Garrlgou·Lagrange 1n general and then diseuss this
particular point 01' proportion.
In his monograph on the realism of the principle of

finality, published in 1932, 8 Garrigou-Lagrange expounds very

f.~ineiEE{

8 P. Reg., Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., !!!. R~alisme !2!!
F'1na11t!, paris, 1932.

B!

r
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Although thoro 1s

carefully the possibility o£ a sixth way.

some evidence that he has since

el~ed

his position somewllat,

his oleaI' and forceful explanation ot the argument warrants

study. 9
In outline. Garr1gou-Lagrange follows the main lines

of the argument as presented above.

The basic fact is that

limited goods do not and cannot satisfy.the appetite of man.
Neither external goods nor internal goods do satisfy, whether

they be of a material or a spiritual nature.
ited goods do show man something.

But these lim-

On the metaphysical pl8.J.'1G

they point out by their limited perfection a cause which is
necessarily unlimited in perteo·tion.

Beyond this, on the

psychological plane their inability to satisfy the appetite
of man demonstl"ates the need of an ob3ect that can satis!'y
the appetite.

This is no longer a question 01" causality;

rather, it is one of

~.l9!litZ.

Garrigou-Lagrange quotes

Thomas:

The objec,t 2! the w111, which is the appetite
man, is unlversatiioog. just as the object of
the intellect Is unIversal truth" It is clear from
this that nothing Is able to sa~isry the will of

or

9 See Buckley f Man t s

~ ~,

It

Foreword. tJ
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man except universal good which is not tound in
any craB ted thing but only 1!!~. .. • • 10

Ue then comments:
Is there not in the natural desire for happiness
a proof contained implicitly in the fourth way of
Saint Thomas with which we are at present concerned
but which 1s based on the 12r1nciple of tlnalit;t;
"every agent acts for an end; a naiur-al !esIre cannot be inefficacious". Gould it be that the metaphys1cal validity of this principle is less oertain
than the prinoiple of efficient causality? And is
it not just as certain without the existence of God
having been proved, since 1t 1s impossible to have
efficient causality or desire without finality? 11
Garr1gou-Lagrange goes some length in explori:rlg the poss1bll1t

of satisfying the appetite by limited good.
~"ld

From experience

from the nature of the rational appetite, he finds that it

1s 1mpossible.

The on11 object that w111 satisty the appetite

must be real; it must be extra-mental-.beeause man doe.s not

10 Garrigou-Lagrange, I.e Rea11em.e, 262. --Obiee tum
aut!!! voluntatis, quae est appetitus h.'iiiianua, est lIDlve:rsa~e'
bonum. siout obiectum Intelleotus est un1versale VGrum. Ex
quo patet, quod nihil poteat quletara YOluntatem homtnis, nisi
bonum unlversale, quod non Invenltur in allquo creato, sad
.....
so....l.....
UJn
......
· !!l Deo. • • •
11 lbl~., 262. ··Nty a-t-il pas la, dans 1e desir
naturel <iu bonneur, una preuve il':Ipliclterllent eontellue dans 1a
4a via de saint Thomas dont noua parlions , l'instant, mais
que .'expllelte par 10 E:r:t1nci e de tinalite "tout agent aglt
pour une tin; un desir nature· -nepauli 8fire vain"
La valeur
metapnysique de eft princ1pe eerait-ella moina eertaine que
celle du prinoipe de causalite efficiente? N'est-elle pas
aussi certains avant meme d'avoir preuve ltexistence de Diau,
pulaqu'11 ne peut y avoir d t eftlcienee et mame de deslr sans
flna.lltey

1

It
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tend to an abstract good, and i'ti must be infinite.

Absolute

good must therefore necessarily be its object and absolute

good must necessarily exist.

He says:

• • • Thus it follows that mall, pursuing not
an abstract lde~ 2!sood ~ 1'&8.+ ~oOd which!!
contained !a thin&~' cannot discover his true beati~ !n ani tinl~e 2!: limited sood, but only in the
Supreme Good (bonmn universals in essendo et in
causando;:-I2
.
Garrlgou offers the usual m.inor of the argut:lent,
that such a natural desire calmot be vain.

To prove that a

natural desire cannot be vain, he uses the metaph.ysical argu ...

ment and that based on a.naJ.ogy with nature to prove that a
natural desire canr.t.ot be 1ne·ftlcaclous.
argument is

too

The metaphysical

usual examination ot the terms asent and

~.

Every agent tends to same determined thing which is suitable
to it.

The end 1s precisely that dete:rmined good.

Without

the end. there is neither sufficient reason tor the agent to
act at all nor for it to act in a. particular way.
prinoiple has ontological validity equal to that

Thus the

or

the prin-

ciple ot efficiency.1J

12 Ibid., 265.-- ••• 11 sten suit que lthQlli~e,
tendant non pa...-veX"$ l'idee abstralte du bien" mais vers ls
I
bien reel
'lu1
2.!E..! ~ choses, ne peuttrouver sa vI'aie
bea.titude en
aueun
bien
tin!
ou
lil1litc£,
mais
seulament dal'l8
........
r ...............
......
·
....
1& Souvera~ ~ (bonum ¥-lliversale !a ess2ndo 21 .!!! causan,do).
13 ~ •• 270.

m

~

Garrigou-Lagrange qualifies the object of manls
natural desire with two notes.
must be real.

In the first place, that object

It is necessarily real because, granted that

truth. 1s formally in the mind, th.e good is formally in things.
The good which we na.turally seek, therefore, will be real

extra-mental good.
thing.

Secondly, that natural object will be one

'rha assertion that it m.ight possibly

be $.

of finite goods, a mere collection, 1s illusory.

succession

For the

question 1s not one of quantIty but rather of quality_
Garrlgou-LagrL~ge

says:

Quantity is not material to the question; the
point at stake here 1s the qual.lty ot the good; for
one might multiply ~ 1ntinitum finite goods without thereby producing ~a.bsorute Good, without
imperfection which i8 oonoeived by the intellect
and acoordingly desired by the w111.. that is the
esser.;.tial reason for the trustration which dismays
the worldling. He travels the surface of the earth;
he turns first to one creature and then another, and
thus it goes wltho!:\t his ever beL'1g fully satisfied
and really happy. ~
Thus Garrlgou-Lagrange underlines the oneness of the true object of the will.

No matter how multiplied, many objects will

not satisfy it.

-----_.-

a

14 Ibid., 272.·-La quantit' ne fait rlen ltaffair
stagit lei de la qualit' du bien; m3ma s1 l'on mu~t1plialt
a ltinfini tous les biens finis, 1ls ne constltueraient pas le

~l

Bien pur, sans melange, que notre intelligence conyo1t, at que
par suite, notre vOlonte deaire. ctest 1a raison profonde de
l 1ennul qU'eprouvent lea mondains, qutils tratnant sur toutes
lea plages du monde; i18 se portent Vel'S une creature, puis
vers une aut~e& at ainsl de suite, sans qu'lls soient jamals
vraiment satlsraits, at veritablement heureux.

l:<'inally, the key question.

Garrigou"'Lagrange asks:

ltSfensuit-il que notre desir naturel du
arrivions

i.

bonhe~

exige que nous

la vision immediate du Dlen Souvera,ln Bien'?u

tl1.£ullement.u15

His

He continues:

But much below the immediate vision of the divine
essence, and much below the Christian Faith, there is
a natural !nowle~ !! go~, ~he author of nature,
whIch arfords us he proo s lor his existence.
Moreover, except th.at original sin has rendered
W':UI,k, that natural knowledge of God
would afford us L~ efficacious natural love of God,
the author of nature, of God, the supreme Good, naturally known. 10

our moral powers

It is this part of the theory of Garrigou-Lagrange--that mants
natural desire is tor a natural vision of God, rather than a
supernatural vision, that will be the tocal point for tho dis-

cussion that follows.

The question is now limited by Garrigou

Lagrange to natural knowledge..

And it the eudaemonolog1cal

argument can draw on this source, there'w!ll be no longer any

15

-Ibid •• 280.

16 Ibid., 280. -~a1s tres au-dessous de la vision
immediate de lieaienee divine, at tr~a au ...dessous de la .f01
cbr't1enue, i1 l' a !! conn&issance naturelle ~ !2.!!!l, auteur
de 1a nature, celle que nous donnent le8 preuves de son
existence.

Et s1 le p$ehe origin~ n 1 ava1t pas attaibli nos
forces morales, cette connaissanee naturelle de Dieu noua
pemettra1t d'arr1ver ~ un amour naturel efficace de Diau,
auteur de le. nature, de Dieu, souvera:;n Bien, naturellement

connu.
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diffioulty of lack of proportion between a finite f'aculty L't1d
an infinite objeot precisely because the mode 01' possession
will be natural.

Nature finds perfect satisfaction in a nat-

ural end.
Why does

Garrigou.r~ange

offer this solution;

namely, the divine goodness naturally known as the tex-m ot the
rational appetite?

Simply because he insists

OIl

perfect sat-

istaction of the appetite. which. only the divine goodness can
give. and because he stays within the resources of

t~

nature.

It 1s rather interesting to note that the much belabored point
of the 1nsufflcien.t satisfaction of'fered by finite objeots is
one quite readily accepted by the adVersaries of the

Heither side denies that

abs?l-~

al~gument.

satisfaction is impossible

short of possession of the infinite object.

Now the agreement

of the adversaries on this point raises one important issue.

Is 1t possible that a faculty can exist without the potentiality ot earfect

!i~tis!aotl,?p.

on the natural plane?

The adver ...

saries sa'1-"'are forced to ma1ntain...that that is possible.
Garrigou-Lagrarlge says that it 1s impossible.

must be

2ertect~1

satisfied.

'rhe appetite

He is torced, therefore, to·hold

that the dlvine goodness, whlch alone oan satlsfy the appetlte,
is the term of the rational appetite.

The position 1s s1rlple.

Because the object 1s absolute good, the nature 1s perfectly

66

satisfIed.

•
Because the possession is natura.l, according to

Garrigou-Lagrange, there is no d1ffleulty about proportIon between finite faoulty and infinite object.

Thus, the main dif-

ficulty of the adversaries 1s sidestepped.

It seems rather

clear, however, that by thus avoiding the difficulty of propor-

l*'or it 1s

tion, Garrlgou"'Lagrange steps into a greater one.

difficult to understand how natura.l possession of God oan be
the ........
absolute, satisfaction his major demands.

We have seen

above that be requires perfect satisfaction of the rational
appetite.

He

insists that manls natural desire will be satis'"

fied only by complete possession of the bonum universale in
t

-

asssndo, universal good, that is, in the order of being.

......

To

satisfy this need of nature, he brings forward now a. natural
possession of that universal good.

Let us consider carefully the hnpllcatlons of this
position.
God. 17
God.

We have outlined above the rela:tion 01' the mind to
We have reViewed the six ways in Which man can know

We have seen that the sixth way, direct vision 01." the

divine essence, 1s the only one which affords direct and pertect knowl.edge of Him.

But we have seen too that the seco:nd

manner of knowing Him is the m9llll.er proper to man in his

17

See this ohapter,

5.

present condition and proper, too, to the present argrrraent.
This seeond mL~er is the rational approach Which by negative-

positive concepts comes to aom.e indirect knowledge of God.
With these points in mind, let us review this theory of
Garrigou·Lagrange.

In the first plaeo. this natural possession o£ God
eannot be the perfect satisfaction that .Garrlgou-Lagrru:lgG in-

sists on in his treatment of the natural desire ot man for happiness.

The

object of that natural desire he has described in

these torms:

bonum universale. 16 Souverain Bien (bonum

un1v;,r sa;Le !B

esse~E.

m.e1anse.

db·

iJ

.....

...........

...............

!! !E: gausandp), and !!.

~

IS

pur, !!ill!

Having insisted on perfect satisfaction of the appe-

tite and baving provided the only object capable of giving
that satisfaction, be otters not pertect posseSSion as

~l&

to

of Dum's desire, but simply possession consonant with the natural power of the intellect.

Thus he offers an unlimited appe-

tite, an unlimited object, and a limited union of the two.
What are the limitations'!

M.an t s possession of the supranle

good will be ind.irect ox- analogical.

Dil-ectl,., the intellect

still has not possessed the supreme good.
supreme good will be negative.

The concept of the

For. as we have seen. the pos-

itive part of the concept, the perfection itself. is taken
directly from the finite objects proportionate to the intellect.

Having denied

L~

limit to this finite perfection, man

68
predicates it ot God.

It mu.st be emphasized that the mind has

conceived only tinite perfection.

It is not a matter of more

or less; it 1s a question here of quality.

That God is pure

perfeetlon, the mind knows; but just what p1l.re perfection is,
it does not know.

The difficulty ls,of course, th.at suoh in-

dlreot,analogical knowledge cannot properly satisfy the mind.
The theory seems to be imperfect in this first respeot then,
that wh.11e se.emingly demonstrating a natural desire for the

supreme good--and therefore fitting perfectly the eudaemonological argument.,... it never satisfies that natural desire

through perfect possession of the supreme good.

Thus

VI

e can

bardly say that the natural desire is tor the su.preme good,
and the

tr~ory,

therefore, otters no support to the eudaemono-

logioal argum.ent.

~"'or

to prove that God does exist from nat ...

ural desire, we must show that lie is the real object of that
natural desire.

And we see that the real objeot of Garrigou-

Lagrange t s natw:-al desire is not a direct possession of God
but only an indirect possession.

il'hus the theory does not

offer perfect satisfaction to the appetite.
foundation for demonstrating
desire.

tt~

aIld

it offers no

existence of God from natural

Again, that desire of its nature terminates directly

in f1nite pertections.

Gra.."1ted, therefore, the existenoe ot

t1nite perf'eotions. the tel'm of its natural desitte is possessed

•
And from fin8.~i ty alone how can it be proved that sotlothlng

more than the tinite term must exist?

The term of tlw appetite

is reached, and that is an end of it as tar as l' l.na~l ty 1s con....
cerned.
Finally, there is same question of the aocuracy of

the statement that the intelleot has a natural desire to know
God perfectly.

fl'here is no doubt that the intellect does de-

sire to know God perfectly.

But is this a natural desire in

the primary sense of that term?

Accottd1ng to an interpretation

of st. Thomas by William R. OIConnott, the answer is in the negative.

His interpretation is this.

~he

primary natural desitte

of the intellect is to know things perfectly.

It will natu-

rally, therefore, seek to know the essence of allj"thing fulJ.y,
and it will know the essence of a thing tully when it Itnows it

in allot its causes.

In describing th.is natural tendency of

the intelleot. Fin!11 sayst
The natural inclination or desire of the mind 1s tor
knowledge; • • • 'l?his natural inclination will eVidently extend to all kuOllledge that may pex-tect the
mind, and this in man t 8 earthly condition is restrioted to the knowledge 01' the essences of material
things. • • Perfect knowledge 01' any object oan only
be said to be ours when we knOW' its ca.uses; henoe the
natura.l desire at: the mind for knowledge is tor knowledge ot essences and their causes. Moreover, knowledge of the mere existence of a causa will not sat1s.fy
this natural desire of the mind, for knowledge of the
essence of that cause 1s also perfective of the mind
and as sucb falls under the mind's natural desire.
There would seem to be no end to this prooess, the
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discovery of the existence of any cause onlY' sti..'I1IUlating further researoh to discover what it is in itself, and therefore what are i t ! causes. 18
The proposition

~

intellectus

natura+"i~.er

substantiae
visionem
.........
............................... clearl,. then is not
~..

....,

initial state of the intellect.

9.

desiderat divinae

description ot the

Primary is the desire to know

perfectly I and .following on this is the perfect ton of lUlowing
particular things totally .. 19

O'COnI10r bas this to say:

Every power, every nature, has its natura.l tendency, which is its natural desire. In the intellect
1s a tendenoy flowing .fror,'I. its natural torm. as intelleot towards krlowledge and truth. tt All men by natt1.rO
desire to know," said Aristotle, and st. Thomas gives
us a special application of this general prinoiple in.
his dootrine of a na~al desire tor the vision at God.
Once we know that God exists, the intellect is still
unsatisfied; it tends by its ve~y nature towards a
further knowledge of Ilim. We know that God exists
through the eelebrated five ways; does anyone imagine
that the human mind 1s oompletely satlsfiedwhen it
reaches the end of the five ways? The intellect cannot be satisfied with partial truth or incomplete
knowledge; 1t tends by a necessity of its nature to
kI>.ow the essence ot: any objeot once it know this muoh
about it .. that it exists. 20
The natural desire of the intellect. therefore, is to
things perfectly.

k~ow

Consequently, once it Itnows of the existence

of God through t..llo five ways, then it desires to know Him

19

ill,2., 335.

20 William R.. O'Connor, The Natural Desl.:re Par God,
Milwaukee, 1948, 33.
_........ -
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perfectly.

•

We note that the initial natural desire of the

intellect is not for God.

If, thareforel this interpretation

of St. Thomas be oorrect, Garrigou-Lagrange's major is considerably weakened.

The primary movement of the intellect; on

the psychologioal plane gives no indioation of hlw necessary
existence of God.

Moreover, the secondary movement toward

God presupposes that his existence is knQwn bef'ore He is desired naturally.

The sixth way, the eudaemonological argu-

ment, finds little footing in this explanation of the nature
of the natural desire of the intellect.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that if the proponents of the eudaemonological argument could expeot to find
support for their theory of natural desire, one would expect
it to come from men like O'Connor and Finili.

l{lor these men

follow in general the doctrine of Sylvester of Ferrara, that
mants desire for the beatific vision is elioited and natural.
That position, i f any, would seem favorable to the sixth way.
Certa.inly, the position of Cajetan, that the desire is elioited and supernatural, would seem less favorable.

And the

position ot Bannez, that the desire is conditional and inetfi.
cacious, offers no help.
A final quotation from O'Oonnor will conclude this
particular point.
It is important, however, to see that to desire

r
12
•

to know en object is not the same as desiriruj an
objeot already known. The intellect naturally de ...
sires to know rnore about God onoe it knows that He
exists} but this does not mean that the will of' man
naturally desires God as our beatitude bef'ore He 1s
seen as He is in Himselt. 21
Thus there is very little probability that we can argue from
the natural desire ot the intellect to the necessary existence

ot God.
To oonclude our remarks on the theory of natural
desire for a natural contemplation ot God, we will consider

Garrigou-La.grange l s use of the term. universal good (ponum
universale) as the formal object of the will.

We have dis-

cussed the tb.ree possible interpretations of this term.
may seem universal good in the order ot being

God. in the order of predication
eral

(!!!

&~~!H-:!). In

(J:!!

(~praedleando),

It

~ssendo)

or

or in gen-

describing the object of the 'Will"

Garrigou-Lagrange says:

t1

• • • 11 a'en suit que Lfhomni.e. • •

ne peut trouver sa vrala b6atltude en aUCUD. bien tin! ou
limit$; .. mals seulement dans 18 Souv.rain Bien (bonum un,1versale
in esaendQ) .11 22 As it stands, that statement is true.

True

beatitude can be had only by direct possession of God.

But

____

III

the point at issue 1s not the tact of bead. tude but the natural

desire ot the will.

Is the natural tendency of the will to

Natura~ ~tsire,

21

O'Connor,

22

Garrlgou-Lagrange,

I:!!.

35.

R'alism~.t 265 ..
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universal good in
general?

tl~

order of being or to universal good in

There seemB to be no disagreement that it is ordered

to good in general.

To use the formal object of the will,

therefore, as if it were synonymous with the adequate object
is to contuse the issue.

And when Garrigou-Lagrange says f'irst

that man can find his beatitude only in the Supreme Good and
then uses that taot to demonstrate man's natural desire for
God. he does use the adequate objeot of the w111 as i f it were
synonymous with the fo:rmal object of the will.
tion is important.

This dist1ne-

O'Mahony puts it rather clearly:

The distinction between the finality of the
intellectual nature as suoh and the realisation
possible in virtue of its natural faculties i8 a
metaphysical necessity. It arises out of the very
antinomy of finite mind, whose "capacities" necea ....
8&Jltily outstep its powers of real1zation. For 11'
the finite mind, left to its natural faculties.
oan attain God only in His f1nite manitestat1011B,
the intellectual nature as such. bas a certain infinity in regard to its object. The object or intelligence and of w111 1s a certa1n potential infinite being. under its transcendental aspects of
truth and goodness. Thus i f the activities of' will
and intellect cannot attain God direotly, but only
in the .formal object or the tf good in generaltt and
the "true in general," yet they reveal the fundamental Qrientation ot the nature whence they proceed. 2J
It is extremely important to distinguish the primary tendency
of the rational appetite, therei'ore, tz-om its secondary move-

23
1929, 253.

James E. QtMahony, ~ Desire Q! ~, Dublin,

r

menta..

As with the will, so wl"t;h the intellect, its 1'01'"[,18.1

object 1s being in general.

Its natural secondary movements

are propol"tioned to the sensible quiddity.

The whole point

of th.e adversaries of too eudaemonological argument is that
the general concept

ot being (!!l!.) must be determined before

we know that it includes Supreme Being as tbe adequate object
of the intellect.

The determination of that con.eept, more-

over, cannot be done by the natural tendency of the :facuJ.ty
toward being as such, but only by way of efficient causality.
We know, in other worda, .finite creatUl"es as the proportioned
objects of th$ intellect.

On the principle of suf'fieient

rea.son, we conclude ths existence of an infinite creator. Thus,
tb.e general concept of being i$ further determined, and within
the adequate object of the intellect lies infinite being.
11'0

swrnnarize then, we have triad to show that

Garrigou-Lagrangefs natural possession of the supreme good
cannot afford the perfect satisfaction h$ demands.

Further-

more, his natural possession of the supreme good cannot be
used to demonstrate the absolute necessity of the existence

ot God because its term is really the finite rather
1nttnite.

tl~l

trw

Again, his natural desire of the intelleot for God

is a seoondary rather than a primary movement.
his use of the term Ulliversal soad is ambiguous.

And, finally,

15
Joseph Gredt uses the traditiona1 five ways to proV$
the ex.istence of God and adds a sixth way based on natural
desire.

This model of the sixth way is q,uite unlike that of

Garrigou-Lagrange.

The basic fact of the argument 1s the same

as that found in other versions of it.

In the human intellect

and will there is a natural appetite tor beatitude whose spe-

cific object 1s infinite good.

Granted this specitication of

the appetite by the infinite good. that good must exist.

natural desire can be vain.
leot and w111 that
appetite.

~eveals

No

It 1s the capacity of the intel....

the specification of the rational

Gredt sa18:

• • • This capacitl Is, however, objectively tnfinite,
things under the aspect 01" being
as such, and the lIill under the aspect of' uni v61'sal
good. Wherefore the objective beatitude of man consists Ul infinite good, which cannot be a created
good. 24the intellect knows

So we have the usual desire and the usual principle that such

a desire cannot be frustrated.
has a peculiar twist.

Gredtta oonclusion, however.

Granted, he says, the natural appetite

foX' infinite good, that infinite good 113 possible.

Since it

....
Friburg~

24

Joseph Gredt, Q.5.B. J !!lemen1ta Ph11$>sophiae.

1937, II, 317. --••• Sed haec capacltaa est

oblective intinlta: Intellectua retertur ad res sub ratione
entia ut sic, at voluntas sub ratione boni universal1.. Quare
beatitudo obi.cttva hom1nls consl.tit 10 bono infinito, quod
non poteat esse aliquod bonum creatum.

is infinite, being possible, it does exist.

Gredt does not

make the familiar transit from the desire to the fac-c of its
object Umnediately beoause he holds that the existence of an
object of natural desire need not be necessary and absolute,

but only possible.

In this instance ot it, however, because

ot the lack of potentialIty

in God, the tact that He is

8ib1. makes His existence a necessity.
be

pos-

Concerning this point

says:

Granted the existence ot a specified object, thare
is no universal and absolute necessity tor the axistence of a specifying cause. But i t is absolutely
necessary that the specifying cause be at least possible. For if the specifying cause were impossible,
the specified objeot would also be 1m:possibla. F'or
U' the cause or specifying agent were absurd, the
effect also or tbe specified object could be no other
than absurd.

Wheretore in our proposItion that nat ...
ural appetite ident1fied \'lith the very nature of the
will would be 1mpossible or absurd, and the will itselt would be impossible and absurd. 25
And in this instance we know that infinite good must exist
once we have granted its possibility because infinite good is

25 I!?,!g., 200. --31 exist! t speoificatum, nOll
sequitur quldem universallter et absolute. necessitate et1am
eausam spec1ticantem exlstere. At absolute. necessitate

sequitur specltleana saitem non esse impossibile. :Ram 81
speclficana esset 1mpo8sib~le. etiam Ipecifloatum impossibiie
esset. 31 8nlm causa seu obiectum dans specifioatlonem
absurdum esset, etlam etractus seu spec1ticatum non posset
non esse absurdum. Q,ufU'e in propoaito nostro appetltus il18
natura11s identlticatu8 cum ipsa voluntatis natura esset
impossIbi11a sau absurdus, 8t ipsa voluntas asset impossibilis
et absurda..
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an absolutely necessary being, which is either impossible or
actually does exist; there can be no potentiality in such

Ii

being.
Gredt t s explanation of the intellect contrasts
sharply with that 01' Garrigou-Lagrange and affords us the
broadest possible interpretation of natural desire.

examine his theory to make this clear.

Let us

The essentially spir-

itual quallt,. of tb& human cognitive facuJ.t'1. he says, embraces within the object 01' that fa.eulty all being, known not

indirectly or analogically, but directly and positively.

He

says:
• • • By that degree of tmmateriallty whien is
found in spirituality strictly so ealJ.ed, the cognitive power 1s established in sueh perfection that
its formal object extends to all things, and 1ndaed
to the attainment ot these things through a strictly
qulddltative knowledge (that is, a positive knowledge ot things as they are in themselves). 26
However, Gredt continues, by reason of its present dependence
on the material faculties, the intellect 2&r accidens, and by
reason of the absence of the light of glory which strengthens

and elevates 1t, is tor the time being excluded from a direct
intuitive Vision ot God.

Consequently, m.an has a positive

26 Ibid .. , 432.
' . . Immaterialitate, quae est
spiritualltas s~rretedleta, eonstltuitur potentia
eognose1tiva tantae perfectionist culus obiectum formale ad
omnia e.xtendatur, it .. quldem ad omnia eognoseenda quiddlta...
tive cognitione qu1dditative stricte dicta (conceptu stricte
qulddltatlvo seu simpliciter positivo.)

ordination to the divine goodness whioh is passive and must
be aetuallzed by the divine power.

On

this point Gredt says:

The intelleot of its very nature ean know this object,
whioh 1s the clear vision ot God, by &11 ordination
not merely of non-repugnanee, but by a positive ordination. This is passive, however, and cannot be
actualized other than by the divine power. 27
Buckley desoribes the position in this way:
Some authors think tbat the natural object ot
the human intellect, the adequate object, perhaps,
but atill natural to it, is being in all its amplitude, in such a way that it includes positively not
only all things but the ability to know them as they
are in themselves. Aocording to th1s view, the faot
that at present we know spiritual things only through
and in the essemees of sensible objects or even that
we know God through and in the mirror of creatures
1s OWing solely to our present condition. Our pr-esent condition ot union of soul and body, or even of
non-elevation to grace, 1s looked upon as a limitation plaeed on the human intellect's broader natural
powers. 'lll1a view holds also that God known as lie
18 1n Himself falls within the Roaitive natural
scope of the human intellect. 26

We might say at once that it 1s not our purpose to adjudicate
the validity of the theory described above.

What is apropos

1s the possibility of proving the existence of God from the
theory.

Does the natural desire of the intellect, as Gredt

27 Ibid., 433Intelleotus natura sua ord1natur
ad hoe obiectuii"O'Ognosoendum, quod est Deus olare visus,
ordinatione; quae quldem non Gst mara non-repugnantia, sod
ordlna.tl0 positiva. passiva tamen, neque aetuabilis nisi
virtute d1v1na.
2 B Buckley, ~an 's Last ~!!!:k 132.
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d••cribes it, support the eudaemonological argument?

It would

seem at fir st glance that this theory of dirac t vision of God
as being within the natural powers of the intellect would sub-

stantiate ·the validity of the eudaemonologlcal argument.

Let

us examine the theory from this point of view.

We note first of all

tl~t

the divine goodness, in

Gredt t s theory, 11es within the adequate" object of the L"'J.telleot and not within the scope of its propel' and proportioned
object

!!!

~

Rresent conditl!ln

2!

~

tacultl.

}"i*or, as we

have seen, the intellGot t s ordination to the clear vision of

God must be actualized by the divine power.

But the validity

of the euda-emonological argument eannot be judged by the ordination at the intellect to its adequate object, but only by

ita proportioned object.

Why?

Because it 1s precisely the

content of the adequate object, i.e. the contentoi' the notion

ot being as such, that must be determined.

'rhat the supreme

be1ng 11es within the adequate object of the intelleot we do
not know trom the initia.l ordination of

proportionate object.

tI.l$

1ntelleot to i'&s

We must argue tram the created effects

that are the proport1oned objeots of the intellect to the
neoessary existence ot a Oreatora.
the Creator is established, we

kJ."lOW

Once then the existence of

that he lies within the

adequate objeot of the intelleot and subsequently we desire
to know him perfectly.

Gredtfa theory, theraetore, utilizing
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the adequate object of the intellect cannot be validly used
to explain the eudaemonologioal argument.
Secondly, in Gredt's natural intuition of God, a
necessary oondition of th.a.t vision is a speoial elevation by
God.

Granted the existence ot God, this theory may explain

a natural desire of the intellect tor Him.

We note, however,

that this theory presupposes the existence of God.

Gredt's

natural desire :tor God is, therefore, an ela.boration hardly
conceivable as long as the proportioned object ot the intellect 1s the sensible quiddity.

To desire to know an object

is not the same as desiring an object already known.

We re-

oall again the important distinction between the metaphysioal
and psychological orders.

In the metaphysical order there 1s

no difficulty about the tinal objeot of natural deslre.
Granted that order, man with the rest of oreation is tending
to God.

oase.

In the psychological order, however, this is not the

The faoulty that entltatively must tend to God need

not consciously tend to Him 1n its elioited aots.

And the

direotion of the latter will depend on the speoitioatlon of
the faoulty.

It that speoification 1s to universal good in

the sense that whatever it does choose it will choose under

the aspect of good, God is not the psychological objeot of
its acts.

Because the eudaemonological argument 1s on the

81
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psychological plane, we must conclude again that Gredt1s
theory cannot be used validly to explain it.

Thus on two

main points, the use of the adequate rather than the proportioned object and the presupposition of the existence of God,
Gredt fails to support not, 1ndeed, his own theory of natural
desire, but the eudaemonolog.ieal argu.ment.

Turning now to the larger controversY' on natural
desire, we will consider briefly the study Father Elter, S.J ••
made of earlier scholastic teaohing on natural des~e. 29
His conolusions will serve to empl14s1ze and support a basic
point of the adVersaries of the eudaemonological argument.
Father Elter came to

"0 conolusions :from his analy-

sis of the history of natural desire.

(1)

Contrary to the

most coumon doctrine of soholastics today, st. Tholnas and his

contemporaries taught that in the natural order man oould
attain only imperfect beatitude.

(2)

The key point in this

doctrinal revolution--that man has a natural desire to be
perfectlY' hapPY'--was the AHSYst1nu!, of Janseu, whioh. appeared
in the year

l~O.

Jansents tb.esis was that man has a natural

desire to be perfectly happy; but this true beatitude oan be

found only in the beatific vision; therefore, man bas a

....
29 E. Elter, S.J., "De natural! bominis
beatitudine ad mentem .cholae antlqulorls." G,regorlanum, DC
(1928), 269"'306.

r..-----------.
natural desire tor the beatifio vision.

Not wishing to deny

the first statement, that man has a natural desire for beati-

tude, scholastic authors denied the second, that true·beatitude can be

fOUl'ld

only in the beatific vision. 30

Father

Eltel' says:
\Y!Je think • • • that the major proposition in the argument of Jansen, which asserts that we have an innate

desire for perfect beatitude, 1s not to be distinguished but simply to be d.(;tnied. Because the innate
desire, or natural ordination, of the will concerns
good in general, not tbe perfect good. the perfect
good is, indeed, desired naturally; not, however,
with an innate desire but with an elicited desire,
as we have explained above. 31

'llhis historical estimate of the problem, if correct, certainly
weakens the eudaemono10gical argument.

That man has no in-

nate desire tor perfect beatl'tude llleans that marl has no natural desire for God in the prim.ary sense ot the term..

it we deny this natural desire, we torestall

~ly

Al'ld

possibility

of arogulng from th.e innate tendency of ths nature to the nec-

essary existence of God.

In denying such a desire, moreover,

the theorY' that man's contemplation in the natural order is
for natural things 1s affirmed.

And this too is contrary

to the analysis of the object of man's desire by the proponent
of the eudaemonologi(H"l argument.

30
31

-

Ibid.,

-

284.

Ibid., 2~.•

Finally, this theory
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upholds the two main contentions of the adversaries of that
argument.

The first is that there is no proportion between

the finite faculty and the infinite object.

The second, that

the proportioned object ot the faculty does not directly include God.
We have reViewed thus ta.r two examples of th.e eudaemonological argmuent which offer the broadest possible interpretations of it.

Garrigou-Lagrange proposed a natural desire

tor an indirect vision of God and beatitude;

Gredt proposed

a natural desire tor direct vision of God and beatitude.
Neither offered safe tooting to the eudaemonological argument.
We shall now consider brietly the study William R. O'Connor
bas made of natural desire.
h~selt

Directly, he does not concern

with the present argument, but several ot his conclu-

sions are pertinent in determining its validity.
Does every creature--intellectual creature, that
1s--have a natural desire tor the beatific Vision?
to O'Connor,

According

st. Thomas's answer 1s a straightforward tlNo.t1

Prior to all actual knowledge, is the intellect tending by its
nature towards this vision as the only object that can finally
put an end to its unlimited craving tor truth? Again, tlNo. n 32
And. this, in spIte

32

at the fact, says a-Connor, that the only

0' Connor t Natural Des ire, 21.

r
historical end man has ever had is that of the vision of God.
The basic factor in the doctrine of st. Thomas,
according to O'Oonnor, when Thomas is speaking of natural desire 1s the primacy of intellect over will.

This primacy ex-

tends even to the innate, natural tendency of the w111.

The

will 1s the eppetlte of the soul which follows an apprehended
good.

The natural object of the will is happiness, but that

happiness is not independent of cognition.

Because man can-

not see God directly in his natural state, and therefore because the intellect never identities the direct vision of God
with the oomplete good as far as natwal desire is concerned,
the will cannot have a natural desire tor the vision of God.
Tha heart of the matter is the primacy of the intellect and
its manner of knowing God.

Since the will f'o.llows the intel-

lect and since the intellect has no natural knowledge of God,
the will can have no natwal desire tor the beatific vision. 33
It is the emphasis that O'Connor places on the doctrine of' Thomas concerning the natural object of the intellect,
and therefore of the will, that is of importance in deciding
the validity ot the eudaemonological argument.

CleQ.l"ly, in

this interpretation of the natural objeot ot the faoulties,

33

-

Ibid., 28.

rr--------.
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the possibility of knowing the existence of God from the proportioned object of the intellect 1s impossible.

What 1s more

decisive is the further development of natural desire by
O'Oannol".

This point we have discussed above.

teach a genuine natural desire for God?

Doea st. Thomas

Yes, he does.

Is tb.a.t

desire a natural desire in the sense of a primary movement of

the rational appetite~

.tiO,

it isn.t.

That desire must be

understood in the light of the relation between the L'1tellect

After we know that God exists through the

and knowledge.

agency of the five ways, then the natural dosire of the intel-

lect to know a thing in all of its causes, to know more a:.nd

more abou.t it until its knowability is exhausted, camoa into
The intelleot, therefore. knowing that He exists desires

play.
to know

~

this 1s that exists.

For our present purpose it

is s·utfioient to point out that this natural desire is conse-

quent to the knowledge of the existence of God..

34

O'Oonnor

pute it this way:
It is important, however, to see that to desire
to know an object 1$ not the s_a as desiring an objec t
already known. The intellect naturally desires to know
more about God onee it knows that He exists; but this
d08S not mean that the will of man naturally desires
God as our beatitude before He is seen as He is in

-

Ibid., )).
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Himself. • • • Even in a state of pure nature,
where tho vision ot God would not have been granted
as the end ot man, the natural desire to see Him
would still be present atte~ His existence came to
be known by reason alone. 3.?
There 1s no question hare ot progressing from an innate desire
to the existence ot 1ts term.

Rather, tram the existence ot

the term., the desire Is awakened to know not only that the

particular objeot 1s but what it is.

When O'Oonnor refers

to reason as the method ot determining the existence ot God,
be

1s reterring to the five ways.

This process, we have

described above; from the proportioned object ot the intellect,
created being, we reason to a

O~ator.

Thus we deteJ:>Y.lline the

content--or a particular part of the oontent of the adequate
object ot the intellect, placing within it the real existeme

ot Supreme

Being.

Why is 1t impossible tor the divine substance to be

the natural end ot any created intelligence?

answer is based on his concept of being..
ing

O'Oonnor's

The simple subsist-

ot the Oreator is on one level; the oompound

oreature 1s on another.
its mode ot being.

The lattarts mode

ootivity follows

Theretore, no natural direot knowledge of

a being on the higher level is possible.

35

or

being of' tho

-Ibid., 35.

Man's natural
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knowledge of God must be indirect, analogical:
Ii10r st. Thomas Aquinas no created intellect
tends by 1ts nature towards a direct and immediate
vision of God as i t8 natural end. '2he analogy ot
being makes this impossible. Knowledge always takes
place accordlngto the way in which the knowing subject &%.i8t8. Where the mode of being of an object
al together transcends the mode of being of the knower,
a direct knowledge of the essence ot such an object
1s above the natu:re ot the knower. God t S mode ot
being ls, as 1t were, to be subslst1..."lg being; avery
creature, spiritual or material, is. not $Ubsistlng
bel1~ but a OOlnpound of essence and existence. This
tact alone makes it impossible for the divine substance tg be the natural end of any created intelligence • .3

In this theory the lack of proportion between the finite
faculty and the infinite term is tully substantiated.

That,

of course, 1s one of the major contentions of the adversarios

of the eudaemonological argument.
To oonclude this ehapter, we shall attempt to summarize the main points that have been made.

This will be done

in a series of questions. which will touch. on the kay issues

under discussion.
Has man a natural desire for the beatific vision?
The answer to thi$ question does not admit of a siutple
As it touebllul

answer.

the present argum.ent only indireotly, we offer

one interpretation of 1t and pass 1:i:n.'11ediately to a more

pertinent facet of the same problem.

36

-

Ibid •• 37.

Regarding this first

88
•

question, however, Father De Broglie, S.J., says this:
It is an article of faith that the vision of
God in store for man exceeds the powers ot human
nature,-.and. it is at least theologically oertain
that be has no exigency tor It;.-lt 1s certain too
that that vision 1s properly supernatural both for
man and for any created spirit. • • •
It is theologically certain, therefore, that
the tact of man's vocation to the divine vision cannot be demonstrated. with certainty by philosophy. 37
We quote this passage simply to point out that man f s natural

desire for God 1s not foX' the bea.tific vision.

Could the

contrary be proved, there would be no question of the validity
of the eudaemonological argument.

But a defender of the argu-

ment need not hold that man has a natural desire for the
beatifio vision.

god.

What he must hold is a natural desire for

But possession of God may tall short of the beatific

Vision.

Thus Garrlgou-Lagrange, a.s we have seen.

Does man have an aptitude tor the beatlfic vision?
Thi.• question concerns the capacity 01.' man for the beatific
viSion.

Granted that it is a 8upernatUlla.l gitt, not required.

37 Vitus De Brogli., S.J., De Fine Ulti!0 I~anae
Iitae, PaX'is, 1948, Pars Prior, 163 andl~ Ad ~dem pertInet
quod visia Dei hominibus praep&ra.ta excedit bumanae naturae
vil"es, ........et saltem theologice certum est quod excedit eius
exlgentla.s,--1mmo quod 111& vls10 proprie supernaturalis eat,
tum in homine,--tum etiam in spirltu quolibet ereato. • • •
lIine theolog1ce certum est factum vocationls hominum
ad dlvinam v1sionem non pos$e per phi1osophiam. carto demons~rarl.

p

by nature, oan man's capacity tor it be demonstrated philosophDe Broglie says:

lcally?

It 1s easily seen that one might grant the
philosopher the mere power of demonstrating that
man could be raised to that vision (God willing),
without thereby conceding him the right or power
ot affirming the exigency of that vision. And only
the latter, properly- spea.king, would ga.insay the
supernatural or gratuitous note of the vision. 38

supernatural aspect of the vision in no way
excludes the opinion that msn's aptitude tor it can
be established with philosophic cert~inty, nor does
it deserve any theological censure. 39

The

Thus, as tax- as

the theologian is

ooncerned, there is no

000-

tradiction in a philosophic demonstration of man- s capacity
for the beatifie vision.

What we are interested in .. however,

is whether this possibility helps the eudaemonologioal argu...

m.nt.

Obviously it does not.

The valIdityof' tbat argument

is based on the absolute necesslty of areal term tor the
rational appetite.

It Is only possible to prove the existence

ot God tram natural desire when

--_._--_.-

betwe~n

the appetite and Its

)8 Ibid ... 192. Sed, ut facile vides, s1 quia
attribuit philosophlae meram potestatem demonstrandl quod homo
Rossit (sl Deo p1acuer1t) ad 111am v1s!onet;1 evehi, is non 1deo
Illttribult philosophiae jus aut potestatem eU'.flrm.andl exigentiam
ll1ius vlsionis,--quod solum proprle eontradiceret BUpernatul'alltati seu gratultatl 1psius.

39 Ibid., 189. Opinio vera secundum quam ipsa.
phl1osophia ce~demonstrare poteat aptltud1nem nominis ad
talem vQoationem neque per supernaturalitatem dlvinae visionls
excluditur,--Neque ullam censuram theologicam merer! videtur.
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object there is an absolutely Il$cessary relation.

But the

tact that nUUl has an aptitude for the beatific vision which

possibly can be demonstrated philosophically shows not a necessary relation but mere capacity.

From mere capacity one

cannot demonstrate the existence of God.
Does man have a natural desire for God oolO\Y the
supernatural. plane that might be used to demonstrate Ilis existence?

~Ne

$l"e not concerned now with the beatific vision.

On

the purel,. natural plane man can be said to desire God in two

ways.

The fil'st concems the m.etaphysical order.

Granted the

relation that 1s established at creation between creature and

Creator. there 1s no dispute that every created good is a par'lcipation of the infinite good of the creator..

In every act

ot appetition, therefore, in seeking created good, necessaril.y,
11' implicitly, we do seek and tend toward the increated Good"

This is certainly a natural desire for God in the metaphysical
order.

Secondly, in the psychological order there is a. nat ...

ural desire for God that 1s basad on the nature of the intel-

lect.

Once the intellect knows that

So

thing exists, it nat-

ura.lly desires to exhaust the knowability of that objeot.
oannot be satisfied with ineanlplete knowledge.

of

tne

It

Having known

existence ot God, therefore, it necessarily tends to

know more a.nd more about lU.,,'n..

This is what we mean by natural

?l
desire for God on the psychological plane.

And this is ex-

plained at length earlier in this chapter.
We have. therefore, tW'o types of natural desire tor

God, and the question is whether either ot tham is sufficient
to establish the validity ot the eudaemonologioal argument.
The natural desire on the ontological plane, i.e. that we
necessarily seek God impliCitly in every act of appetition,
does not balp the argument.

To know of this implicit desire

for God, we must first know that God exists.

In other words,

the ontological order must first be established.

Yet it is

precisely th.e foroe of the euda.emonologioal argu.ment that it
presupposes no such. order.

The natural desire on the psycho-

logical plana oan not support the argument either.

Aga.in,

before that desire is conceived, the existence of God must be
known.

Only consequent to the taet

lect seek to know

!!!!!

~

God is does the

in<~el ..

He is--to know Him perfeotly in all

aspects.
Can the rational appe'tite orman be perf"ectlysa.t-

iafled short of the beatific vision'l
to this question, no.

Th.ere 1s only one answer

It 1s tbe very nature of the rational

appetite that being capable ot possessing God in his f'ulness,
b7 reason of thAll universality of its formal object, nothing
short of full possession of Htm will perfectly satisfy the
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